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Platform services are increasingly becoming distributed to improve the avail-
ability and latency of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) applications. Modern
infrastructure services such as Kubernetes have enabled a seamless deployment of
these platform services across the distributed edge and cloud subsystems. These
infrastructure services support dynamic addition and removal of resources, and
thus, they enable the elasticity of the edge-cloud platform services. However,
these infrastructure services currently do not have a high-level view of platform
services and make elasticity decisions based on low-level configurations provided
by the stakeholder.
This thesis aims to support trust establishment in the elasticity operations of
these edge-cloud platform services. We present the ZETA framework that in-
troduces Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) secure design paradigm into these elas-
ticity operations. ZETA ensures trusted elasticity of platform services via con-
textual Gaussian Process Regression (GPR) based trust computation from the
“observed” and “service” knowledge. Moreover, it supports elasticity delegation
capabilities through a token-based platform-agnostic interaction model. Finally,
ZETA allows the stakeholder to provide custom trust policies, fine-tune the trust
algorithm and even extend it.
The evaluation of the ZETA framework on multiple real-world scenarios demon-
strates its ability to support zero-trust elasticity in variety of operations. More-
over, the encouraging results from the performance evaluation exhibit a low re-
source utilization and delineate precise resource requirements of ZETA provision-
ing.
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Les services de plateforme sont de plus en plus distribués pour améliorer la
disponibilité et la latence des applications de l’Internet Industriel des Ob-
jets (IIdO). Les services d’infrastructure modernes tels que Kubernetes ont permis
un déploiement transparent de ces services de plateforme dans les sous-systèmes
distribués de périphérie et du cloud. Ces services d’infrastructure prennent
en charge l’ajout et le retrait dynamiques de ressources, et permettent ainsi
l’élasticité des services de plateforme périphérie-cloud. Cependant, ces services
d’infrastructure n’ont actuellement pas une vision de haut niveau des services de
plateforme et prennent des décisions d’élasticité sur la base de configurations de
bas niveau fournies par la partie prenante.
Cette thèse vise à soutenir l’établissement de la confiance dans les opérations
d’élasticité de ces services de plateforme périphérie-cloud. Nous présentons le
cadre ZETA qui introduit le paradigme de conception sécurisée Zero Trust Ar-
chitecture (ZTA) dans ces opérations d’élasticité. ZETA garantit l’élasticité de
confiance des services de la plateforme par le biais d’un calcul de confiance contex-
tuel basé sur la régression du processus gaussien (GPR) à partir des connaissances
“observées” et “du service”. En outre, il prend également en charge les capacités
de délégation de l’élasticité par le biais d’un modèle d’interaction agnostique de
la plate-forme basé sur des jetons. Enfin, ZETA permet aux parties prenantes
de fournir des politiques de confiance personnalisées, d’affiner l’algorithme de
confiance et même de l’étendre.
L’évaluation du cadre ZETA sur de multiples scénarios du monde réel démontre
sa capacité à prendre en charge l’élasticité sans confiance dans une variété
d’opérations. De plus, les résultats encourageants de l’évaluation des perfor-
mances montrent une faible utilisation des ressources et délimitent les besoins
précis en ressources de l’approvisionnement ZETA.
Mots Clés: cloud computing, edge computing, systèmes distribués, ar-
chitecture à confiance zéro, microservices, sécurité du cloud,
sécurité des microservices, élasticité des microservices
Langue: Anglais
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“ Technology trust is a good thing, but control is a better one”
– Stephane Nappo
1.1 Context
To ensure high availability and reliability of platform services with latency guaran-
tees, a modern Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) platform service infrastructure
is typically decomposed into three major subsystems. They include the Internet
of Things (IoT), edge and cloud subsystems. Each of these subsystems is char-
acterized by varied computing capabilities. Cloud is often located in a remote
data-centre and boasts of high-scalability and theoretically unlimited storage ca-
pabilities [79]. On the other hand, edge subsystems are more recent extension
to cloud and are usually situated in proximity to the IoT systems (such as base
station, routers) [72]. They are especially useful for providing latency-sensitive
computational offloading services [72, 87] with limited scalability and storage ca-
pabilities.
To service the IoT subsystem, multiple platform services run atop the edge-
cloud infrastructure. These platform services often constitute of multiple dis-
tributed microservices [69]. Microservices are disintegrated but highly cohesive
services that typically perform a single operation. Moreover, containerization of
these microservices provides an abstraction for uniform deployment across diverse
kinds of edge-cloud systems while maintaining low resource overhead [86]. Exam-
ples of platform service include message brokers (such as Apache Kafka1), stream
processors (such as Apache Flink2), etc.
As the organizations diversify their deployment, dedicated infrastructure ser-
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form services across heterogeneous subsystems [83]. These infrastructure services
share common control plane for resource allocation and management across subsys-
tems [40]. Often these infrastructure services are present as container orchestration
framework such as Kubernetes3. Other techniques involve resource management
of Virtual Machine (VM) [33]. Nonetheless, the ability to add or remove resources
on ad-hoc basis is one of the cornerstone of edge-cloud infrastructure services
and forms elasticity of the edge-cloud continuum. However, elasticity is a multi-
dimensional concept [17]. Any effect on resource elasticity (due to security or
otherwise) may have effect on resilience and availability of these platform services.
Modern infrastructure services support affinity-aware offloading [66] and en-
able dynamic elasticity of resources while maintaining intra-operability. However,
this dynamic elasticity is also associated with major research challenges. As per
[32], one of the major research challenge is ensuring trust in the elasticity oper-
ations of these infrastructure services. There is a complex dependency between
the microservices of an edge-cloud system [43] and any security attack (elastic or
otherwise) has a potential to cascade across the edge-cloud system. For example,
if a message broker on edge is compromised, the attacker can alter the rate of data
publication. A downstream microservice that consumes the data from the afore-
mentioned compromised message broker may elastically scale itself to adjust to this
new rate of message publication. From [15], we know that situations such as these
pose security threats such as lateral microservice movement or data exfiltration.
Moreover, this situation can also cause resource and monetary wastage to the orga-
nizations and Cloud Service Provider (CSP). Therefore, to avoid such situations,
it is imperative to have a high-degree of trust on any elasticity operation.
This thesis aims to support trust establishment in the elasticity operations of
the edge-cloud platform services. Infrastructure services currently lack the high-
level view of elasticity and make elasticity decisions based on low level config-
urations provided by the stakeholder. Ideally, any elasticity framework should
have a high-level view of all the platform services to dictate elasticity logic to in-
frastructure service. In essence, we must take away the elasticity logic from the
infrastructure service and pass it a system that does have such a high-level view.
Such a system is said to follow Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) security design
paradigm which is based on “trust no-one” approach and limits internal lateral
movement [67]. Therefore, to avoid such situations, an edge-cloud service can
utilize ZTA paradigm for its elastic operations.
Our work aims to provide support to the primary stakeholders (which are edge-
cloud platform service developers) by improving the trust of elasticity of edge-cloud
microservices through a framework that introduces ZTA security paradigm into
the elasticity operations of the edge-cloud infrastructure service. Other secondary
3https://kubernetes.io























Figure 1.1: Subsystems and platform services in GPON edge-cloud monitoring
infrastructure
stakeholder may include the cloud services provider since they are typically bound
by Service Level Agreements (SLA) and hence need to ensure certain level of
elasticity and robustness in their resource services. Unlike traditional ZTA use-
cases such as [53, 67], we cannot rely on manual multi-factor authentication due
to stricter automation requirements in elasticity of distributed systems.
1.2 Motivating use-case
Here we present a motivating use-case of GPON to further illustrate the need of
high-trust in elasticity operations of the infrastructure services. Let us consider a
system that monitors and analyzes the status of equipments in an ISP network.
We can see from Figure 1.1 that this monitoring infrastructure is structured as
a typical IIoT infrastructure with three different subsystems. The GPON ISPs
infrastructure consist of many equipments. Later in this thesis (Section 3.2), we
discuss the GPON monitoring infrastructure and the data (type, amount, and
flow) in more detail.
The edge and cloud subsystem of this monitoring infrastructure provides reli-
able analytics to the GPON developers. To support these analytics, the GPON
developers use different platform services. For example, the edge subsystem con-
sists of a MQTT broker that captures information from the sensor subsystem. The
local edge analytics is a containerized microservice that publishes the results to
the cloud subsystem. The cloud broker (Apache Kafka) has the ability to scale up
and down depending on the rate of data publish requests coming from the edge
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 16
subsystem’s microservice.
While the security of these services are usually carefully considered, “security”
of elasticity operations is often overlooked. As with most cases, the infrastructure
services use simple threshold of resource usage as elasticity logic. In the edge-cloud
subsystems shown in Figure 1.1, it is usually 60–70% of CPU or memory resource
usage, before extra resources are allocated to compensate the increase in demand.
In such situations, if an attacker is able to gain access to edge subsystem, they can
cause unnecessary scale-up or scale-down operation on the cloud broker simply by
varying the rate of data publication. This is a very simple but classic mapping of
how a security incident on edge can indirectly affect the elasticity of cloud broker.
Moreover, due to the dynamic nature of such edge-cloud systems, it is not practical
for the developers to manually monitor or work on the elasticity operations.
From the example above, we identify three basic problems for stakeholders.
That a) the trust in elasticity operations is often implicit and checked at a low-
level by the infrastructure and that there is a no proper holistic and high-level
view of trust. Another issue is b) the lack of a proper framework architecture that
can evaluate trust on a high-level and multidimensional observed data metrics
and c) the lack of trust-level customization and granular policy enforcement for
stakeholders’ specific use-case.
1.3 Research questions and requirements
Through this thesis, we aim to improve trust in elasticity operations of a service.
Towards that end, we aim to answer the following research questions:
 RQ1: Architecting the trust in elasticity: What should be the guid-
ing principle of trust in elasticity operations? More importantly, is there any
framework that has a high-level view of the platform services (and infrastruc-
ture services) and supports elasticity operations for infrastructure services.
Finally, how can this high-level “trust” be calculated.
 RQ2: Ensuring trust in interaction: How can we ensure that the inter-
action between services and framework is non-compromised. How can we
model and represent the interaction between for diverse resources in edge-
cloud systems with high-integrity.
 RQ3: Customizable policies, fine-tunable trust and extensible trust
evaluation: How can the stakeholder create custom policies and enforce
them with microservice-level granularity. Moreover, how can we support
stakeholders to fine-tune the trust levels via configuration files and utilize
the output as policy. Finally, how can we allow stakeholders to extend the
trust algorithms and supplant with their own?
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1.4 Approach
To reliably solve the problem of trusted elasticity and answer the previously men-
tioned research questions, we adhere to the following approach:
 We present real-world motivating scenarios and collate use-cases based on
them. These use cases serve as the basis of functional and non-functional
use-case requirements of our framework.
 Based on the functional requirements, we design a framework named ZETA
to improve trust of elastic operations of edge-cloud platform services.
 We describe an interaction model that allows the infrastructure services to
utilize ZETA framework securely and with integrity. This model is platform-
agnostic.
 We present techniques to calculate trust level and evaluate policies with a
high-level view of the deployed platform services.
 We present methodologies to allow the stakeholder to manage their custom
trust policies and fine-tune their trust levels. We also present techniques
to extend ZETA framework by executing external trust algorithms of stake-
holder’s choice.
 We implement the ZETA framework and evaluate its feasibility on multi-
ple real-world scenarios. We also perform performance evaluation of ZETA
framework and discuss these evaluation results.
1.5 Contributions
Through this thesis, we aim to provide answers to the research questions that we
raised in Section 1.3. Accordingly, we state the following contributions of this
thesis:
 ZEro Trust elAsticity (ZETA) Framework: We contribute a comprehensive
ZETA framework which has following features:
 Ensure support of trusted elasticity in distributed edge and cloud plat-
form services with a token-based interaction model
 Platform-agnostic interaction model support for infrastructure services
with both shared control plane (homogenous) and data plane (heteroge-
neous)
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 Elasticity delegation capabilities through the use of a combination of
two distinct JWT tokens
 Contextual and multi-dimensional uncertainty and trust-level computa-
tion through captured observed and service knowledge
 Default trust computation algorithm that uses Gaussian Process Regres-
sion (GPR). Our algorithm supports near real-time trust level sampling
 Extensibility of trust computation by allowing providers to supplant their
own custom algorithm with the default GPR trust algorithm
 Customizability in trust level management through simple configuration
files
 Microservice level granularity in trust-enforceability through support for
user-defined policies
We implement the prototype of the ZETA framework and open-source it into
the GitHub repository at https://github.com/rdsea/ZETA. This repository con-
tains all the code, scripts, testing utilities and the documentation of ZETA frame-
work. Additionally, we perform the evaluation of framework on two distinct real-
world scenarios. This functional evaluation is aimed at proving the usefulness of
the framework. We also validate the performance, latency and quantify resource
utilization through stress test of ZETA framework. Together with scenario based
evaluation and performance evaluation, we address the two most important aspects
(functional and non-functional) of software testing [71].
This design and capabilities of this framework is based on our previous work
on the understanding of security-elasticity dependency analytics in edge-cloud mi-
croservices [61]. The knowledge gained and lessons learned during the development
and evaluation of SEDAICO framework4 were pivotal in the development of ZETA
framework.
1.6 Thesis structure
Chapter 2 gives the background knowledge and the related work in the domain
of trusted elasticity. Chapter 3 introduces the motivating scenarios and the use-
cases. We extract the functional and non-functional requirements of our framework
in this chapter. The models, designs, workflows and the implementation of ZETA
are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the evaluation results and discusses
the security and configurability of the framework. It also examines the lessons
learned during the evaluation. Finally, the thesis presents the concluding remarks
and explores the future work in Chapter 6.
4https://github.com/rdsea/SEDAICO
Chapter 2
Background and related work
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present the background focusing on trust in the elasticity in
edge and cloud services. This will help us establish a research gap and delineate
state-of-the-art methodologies that are being used to ensure trusted elasticity in
these edge-cloud services.
Since this thesis focuses on enhancing trust in elasticity operations, our main
review of related work pivots around it. Moreover, we also present literature
review on resource elasticity and methodologies to promote trust (not necessarily
only elastic trust) between subsystems and microservices in an edge-cloud system;
as they provide a pivot for our work to build upon.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Elasticity
One of the major guarantees that most cloud providers give in their SLA is “elas-
ticity” of resources [17, 51, 61, 68]. Elasticity in the edge and cloud computing
scenario is often misnomered as simple addition/removal of resources on ad-hoc
basis. However, elasticity is a multi-dimensional aspect and can be applied at
many levels in our edge-cloud continuum [21, 68, 78].
2.2.1.1 Multi-Dimensional elasticity
The elasticity in edge-cloud continuum can be broadly classified as resource elas-
ticity, cost elasticity, and quality elasticity [21]. Resource elasticity is the classic
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notion of elasticity which allows dynamic resource provisioning into the infrastruc-
ture. These resources could be CPU, memory, VMs, VNFs, etc. Cost elasticity
on the other hand is the variance of cost with reference to the responsiveness of
the resources. In this elasticity, the resource allocation under the constraint of
cost is measured. For example, how will the resources be distributed under a total
budget of X euros. Lastly, quality elasticity deals with measurement of quality of
service with the change in resource usage. This dimension of elasticity focuses on
the trade-off between resource deployment and quality of services [78]. Our thesis,
however, solely focuses on resources elasticity.
2.2.1.2 Multi-level elasticity
The elasticity can also be categorized at the different levels of granularity. These
categorizations include cloud service, service units, code regions [17]. At cloud
service level, the elasticity of the whole application such as complete GPON mon-
itoring infrastructure is measured. At the service unit level, the elasticity of indi-
vidual service such as a database is the focus. On code unit level, the elasticity
at individual units of executable code is measured. This thesis focuses on service
elasticity.
2.2.2 Trust in systems
Trust is a very subjective term and very difficult to guarantee1. As per Dieogo
Gambetta’s definition of trust in [23], “Trust is a subjective probability with which
an agent will perform a particular action ...”. It is important to note here that
trusts are not necessarily transitive. That is, if Alice
trusts−−−→ Bob and Bob trusts−−−→
Carol then Alice
trusts−−−→ Carol may not hold true. In terms of distributed system, the
notation of trust is even more elusive. The notion of trust in a distributed system
is popularly accepted as a presence of proper access rights between nodes [9].
2.2.2.1 Trust in the context of distributed systems
According to [85], trust between nodes of a distributed system implies that any
hosts expects the operation requests from a “trusted” source are benevolent with
a high-degree of confidence. This confidence can be improved by improving the
security of the operation requests.
Distributed trust in edge-cloud services (systems) can modelled as implicit and
explicit (See Figure 2.1). In implicit trust, the service unit determines the trust
of any request. Verification of cryptographic certificates of any entity or request is
1“There’s no test possible that can prove the absence of flaws”: Bruce Schneier. From: Why
Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks.
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an example of implicit requests. In case of explicit trust, a level of indirection in
form of a trusted third-party with security policies is added. These policies can be
defined through various external sources such as ML models, stakeholders, human
experts, etc.
















Figure 2.1: Implicit vs explicit trust in distributed environment
2.2.3 Platform services vs infrastructure services
One of the distinctions that we make in this thesis is that of platform vs infrastruc-
ture services. Platform services execute the developer application whereas infras-
tructure services provide resources to run these platform services. The resource
elasticity of platform services are managed by these infrastructure services. As the
elasticity is controlled by the infrastructure services, the framework must always
interact with infrastructure services and never with platform services. However, it
is always the elasticity of platform services that is evaluated.
2.2.4 Zero trust architecture
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) (Formalized in NIST’s 800-207 special publication)
is defined in [67] as a cybersecurity paradigm that is designed around “trust no one”
principle. In this security design paradigm, trust is never granted implicitly but
must be continuously assessed. As per [11] and [67], any ZTA based architecture
MUST have following three components:
1. Policy Engine (PE): grants the decision to a subject for access to any object
2. Policy Administrator (PA): Acts on the decision of PE. Generates credentials
or additional instances in case of access grants.
3. Policy enforcement point (PEP): The endpoint for a subject to request de-
cision from PA.
Use of ZTA paradigm forms the backbone logic of our framework. Figure 2.2
presents a visual description of the elasticity of a system that follows ZTA paradigm.










Figure 2.2: ZTA design paradigm [11]
2.2.5 Gaussian processes for trust
We use gaussian processes for calculating contextual trust levels from the observed
data. A gaussian process generalizes the “Gaussian probability distribution” [63].
Unlike regular non-linear regression methods, a GPR is also able to provide its own
uncertainties. Another distinctive property of bayesian (and gaussian) distribu-
tions are that they are closed under conditioning and marginalization [26]. Hence,
any output derived from the GPR would follow a similar probability distribution.
Using these distributions with mapping of uncertainties to confidence intervals is
an intuitive way to define boundaries of trust.















Figure 2.3: A sample GPR curve for the function xsin(x)*
*(Representative image generated from the sample code of [56])
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Figure 2.3 presents a sample regression of the function f(x) = xsinx(x) using
GPR. A GPR is represented by the Equation 2.1 and requires calculation of a
symmetric covariance matrix (S) [63] and mean (m). Here, f is the function value,
X∗ are the test inputs, and X are the training (observed) points. Finally, K(X∗,X)
is a matrix of shape (X∗ ×X). Further details on gaussian processes, kernels and
the derivation of Equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 can be found in Carl Rasmussen &
Christopher William’s book at [63].
f | X,y, X∗ ∼ N(µ, S), where




S = cov(f) = K(X∗,X∗) −K(X∗,X)[K(X,X) + σ2I]−1KT(X∗,X)
(2.1)
2.2.5.1 RBF kernels
The covariance matrix from the previous equation is also called the kernel. GPR
“learns” the non-linear function in the linear space defined by the kernel. Kernels
are also used in other domains of machine-learning such as Support Vector Ma-
chines [4]. RBF2 kernels are one such stationary kernels that use an exponentiation











Equation 2.2 presents the RBF kernel, where γ is equal to 1/2σ2. Our thesis
uses RBF kernel for the GPR as it can tuned easily. Moreover, as it is a stationary
kernel and therefore its output remains same even after subjecting it to translation.
2.2.5.2 White noise kernel
White noise kernel is an ancillary kernel that represents the noise of the train-
ing data as independent and identical. This work utilizes the Equation 2.3 from




Nl, if xi = xj
0, otherwise
(2.3)
2RBF kernels are also called squared exponential
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2.3 Related work
2.3.1 Trust models for edge-cloud services
While there is a plethora of literature on edge-cloud security, limited works at-
tempt to model trust in an elastic cloud infrastructure. The work by Y. Jarraya
et at. [30] provides systematic mechanism to model and verify the security of VM
layer in cloud. More specifically, they focus on modelling the VM layer deployment
via an algebraic calculus framework. Sahli et al. [68] model the cloud elasticity
through non-conventional bi-graphical reactive systems. They divide the cloud
services into two zones namely frontend and backend. It then creates the elasticity
models through a bigraph that is represented as a set of reaction rules between
these two. This approach, however, lacks the ability to represent elasticity in a
logical, graphical and rigorous way. CPL [10] is a statically typed cloud program-
ming language that focuses on fault-tolerance but also takes into consideration the
elasticity models of cloud and edge deployment. Chunlin Li et al. [38] propose a
limited model of distributed edge-cloud resource load prediction and management
for both vertical and horizontal elasticity.
RECAP [54] models reliable capacity provisioning of edge and cloud services.
It includes a “RECAP application modeller” that defines the edge cloud services
and their respective QoS requirements. It additionally includes components like
workload modeller, optimizer and scheduler to execute those resource workloads
efficiently. Modelling of elasticity in edge-cloud systems is not limited to the
perspective of trust or security. There are attempts to model elasticity based on
energy efficiency. Works such as [8, 29, 51] model the elasticity of cloud services
based on energy efficiency of the platform. [8] and [51] models the elasticity scaling
with energy efficiency for SaaS, PaaS and IaaS platforms whereas [29] models only
for PaaS and IaaS services.
While we draw inspiration from different approaches taken to model trust in
elasticity in cloud computing paradigm, unfortunately most of these work limit
their scope to either cloud or edge subsystems and do not propose a model that
unifies both edge and cloud. Our work on the other hand is both subsystem and
platform agnostic. That is, unlike works such as [8, 10, 29, 51, 54], our work
can support all platform service models. Furthermore, unlike [30, 68], ZETA can
support distributed edge and cloud platform services.
2.3.2 Trust in elasticity of edge-cloud system
There are relatively few literatures that take into consideration the trust parame-
ters in determining service deployment on the edge and cloud nodes. One of the
first approaches to address trust in cloud deployment was the work by J. Luna
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et al. in [41] and [42]. They propose Quantitative Policy Trees [42] that allow
mapping and processing cloud security level agreements through a data struc-
ture. They further expand their work in [41] to add Quantitative Hierarchical
Processes and rank cloud service providers by security levels provided in their
SLA. TRUST-CAP [2] attempts to evaluate behaviours and recommend cloud re-
sources to the user. TRUST-CAP has separate components to provide trust in its
elasticity recommendation (such as privacy, integrity) based on collected metrics.
However, this model is only evaluated with man-in-the-middle and man-at-the-end
attacks. Our work on the other hand, can also mitigate lateral movement and data
exfiltration and denial of services attack.
S. Forti et al. propose SegFog [22] which is a framework to improve trust in
secure deployment of edge-cloud services. SegFog uses ProbLog3 library to define
probabilistic trust models. To use SegFog, any stakeholder (CSP and application
operator) needs to provide extra Node Descriptor files that contain information
about the “Security Capabilities” and “Security Requirements”. Additionally,
they also need to provide the composite trust values of each node that they have
or require. Since this trust framework requires declaration of a pre-defined trust
values from the CSP, multiple malicious CSP’s can therefore collaborate to attack
the trust model. The ZETA framework evaluates every trust value in isolation
from the CSP and hence is hardened against such attacks.
Other literatures attempt to address elasticity of trust only on a specific edge-
cloud resource types and fail to provide a uniform framework that can operate
on rich use-cases and resources across the edge-cloud continuum. For example,
Diggi [25] framework allows deployment of secure serverless functions through the
use of TEEs (Intel’s Software Guard Extensions [18] in this case). However, this
requires all the machines to be build upon SGX. Our work, however, does not
have any such hardware requirements. B. Qolomany [58] propose a trust based
machine learning model selection and deployment for IIoT and smart city services.
This work, however, only focuses on initial deployment of models and not about
the trust in subsequent elasticity which is addressed by our work. ENORM [82] is
another framework that provides resource management feature to the edge-cloud
services. This framework focus on reducing the latency of the resource provisioning
and scaling on the edge systems with online games as the use-case. However, unlike
the token-based approach of ZETA, such a system does not take security aspect
into consideration
Finally, there has been a rise in use of artificial intelligence and Machine Learn-
ing (ML) for establishing trust. PREPARE [76] uses a tree-augmented naive
bayesian network for resource metric value prediction. More recent works lever-
age the power of deep-learning for these predictions. The work in [24] proposes a
3https://github.com/ML-KULeuven/problog
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hybrid model using CNN and grey wolf optimization. It uses a relatively simpler
4 layers of CNN networks and provides an F-score of more than 99%.The work
in [84] performs a resource offloading based on n neural networks and training
each of them with a randomly batched data from the database. However, these
approaches revolves around anomaly detection (such as [24, 50, 60, 76] etc.) or
resource optimization (such as [84]) through captured data and is often passive
i.e. it needs to train a model. However, all these AI/ML models treat outliers as
anomalies and anomaly detection is an indirect way of establishing trust. Other
important aspect is that these frameworks fix the ML model used for establish-
ing trust and does not allow the user to fine-tune trust level or use custom ML
models. ZETA addresses both these shortcomings, i.e. direct context-based trust
evaluation and complete trust configurability to the stakeholder. While ACAS [48]
framework does allow fine-tuning, it does not provide extensibility feature and has
limited support for policies. Commitment [3] framework uses a novel trust evalua-
tion algorithm. However, it does not provide support for custom policies and trust
customizability. Konstantinos et al. [55] propose a SLA and reputation based trust
model and a framework based on this model for provisioning of resources on cloud.
It relies on a long-term reputation of a resource from a providers based on their
key performance indicators. However, similar to SegFog [22], such a approach will
be vulnerable to long-term collaboration attacks. As our work computes the trust
level both on short and long term observed and service metrics, it is relatively
hardened against such attacks.
2.3.3 Elasticity in edge-cloud infrastructure services
The current auto-scaling solutions for the infrastructure are too low-level [14].
That is, they use a configuration-first approach. Developers embed the policies
and rules into the deployment configurations and the infrastructure’s control plane
drives the elasticity based on them. Few works such as [6, 35] provide support for
external policy evaluation for the auto-scalers. While this approach allows an eas-
ier management of scaling operations, we argue that providing ZTA support on
elasticity is difficult due to static nature of configuration files. Firstly, this ap-
proach does not decouples the auto-scaling logic from the deployment, meaning
that third-party trust cannot be established. Secondly, none of the approaches
perform a multivariate trust analysis from the observed data and finally, this ap-
proach does not work well with heterogeneous solutions. That is, due to a lack
of a centralized and third-party trust establishment framework, elasticity requests
of infrastructure services cannot be interchangeably requested by different infras-
tructure services. For example, a Kubernetes horizontal pod auto-scaler cannot
and should not be trusted to scale on a request from docker-swarm auto-scaler due
to violation secure design principles of Saltzer and Schroeder [73].
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2.4 Summary
This chapter provides the background necessary for this thesis. As our framework
attempts to build trust for the elasticity operation in distributed microservice, we
also formally introduce the notion of trust for distributed systems in this chapter.
We present the methods of GPR and provide an idea why they are suitable for
calculation of trust levels in our framework. This chapter also briefly introduces
the concept of how the gaussian processes operate and the function of the kernels
involved in them. We succinctly introduced two kernels that will later be used
during the implementation of GPR in the framework.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no descriptive state-of-the-art research
work that aims to provide answer to the research questions raised in Section 1.3.
That is, none of these researches :
 Model interaction techniques that provide trusted elasticity operations across
distinct scenarios and use-cases in an edge-cloud services. Most of them
enforce trust in a domain-specific subset of use-cases.
 Provide a unified framework for managing the trust of elastic operations
along with providing the capability of customize it to different stakeholders.
Chapter 3
Trusted elasticity requirement anal-
ysis
3.1 Overview
Our aim in this thesis is to support stakeholders in increasing the trust of elas-
ticity operations in their platform services. Towards that end, we consider two
real-world scenarios and their problems to derive requirements of our proposed
framework. Through these use-cases, we gather, extract and analyse the trusted
elasticity requirements that our framework must support. They cover a variety of
aspects on the architecture capabilities and limitations. Using these different de-
ployment models allows us to accommodate varied use-cases and thereby evaluate
our framework across wide spectrum of trusted-elasticity problems.
This chapter presents two real-world edge-cloud infrastructure scenarios. They
are diverse in their operations, platform services and the types of deployment
infrastructure service used. In each of these scenarios, we define multiple use-cases
along with the stakeholder, preconditions, activities, alternative activities and end-
goals. Based on these use-cases and the research questions discussed in Chapter 1,
we then derive concrete requirements of our framework.
3.1.1 Elasticity in the scenarios
To improve the trust in elasticity operations, our framework incorporates the de-
sign principles of ZTA and uses explicit trust. All the infrastructure services of
an edge-cloud subsystem must require approval from the framework before any
elasticity operation. Figure 3.1 presents a high-level view of a service’s elastic-
ity operations. This is applicable for all the services in both the scenarios. We
will delineate the implementation details and request-response of the framework
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in subsequent chapters.
To ensure trust in the elasticity operations in these scenarios, the requests must
be approved only through pre-determined rules by domain experts. Distribution
of subsystems adds a level of indirection and exposes the attack surface area.
Therefore, the rule maintenance must be centralized to ensure higher security of
the component. We can say that as long as this centralized PEP is secure, we can
trust the elasticity operations. Moreover, making it centralized also ensure that
the rules are easier to manage and maintain. Finally, having a centralized PEP in












Figure 3.1: Interaction with ZETA framework
3.2 Scenario: GPON network monitoring
Our first scenario is of the equipment monitoring subsystem. This scenario has
been developed by us and is based on our work on security-elasticity analytics
in [61]. GPONs are point to multi-cast networks and are extensively used to
provide the fibre to home services by the ISPs. GPON uses passive splitters inside
the network and multi-casts the downstream network data to all the terminal
endpoints called ONT. These GPON networks infrastructure comprise of multiple
equipments such as PON, DSLAM. In order to provide internet services, the data
from these devices goes via PON ports to an OLT terminal.
A PON port can handle 64 ONU whereas the OLT can have 2048 ONU. Hence,
each OLT can be used for around 700–800 customers. The OLT publishes the data
at the rate of 1 data per sensor every 5 minute. Appendix A summarizes the data
schema and sample data of the IoT subsystem published onto the edge broker in
the Listing A.1 and Table A.1 respectively. Note that the GPON infrastructure
comprise our IoT subsystem. The GPON monitoring consist of our edge and cloud
subsystem.
As discussed in the introduction, a modern IIoT infrastructure consists of mul-
tiple subsystems. The GPON monitoring system uses edge and cloud subsystems
with “n→1” flow. That is, multiple IoT subsystems publish to the edge, whereas
multiple edge systems connect to a single cloud. This means that the edge devices
do not interact within themselves and that there is a single tier of edge subsystem.
This is in contrast to the other scenario that we discuss later.
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Subsystem Platform services Units Infrastructure
service units
Edge Message Broker, Data publishing
and consuming microservices
Containers
Edge & Cloud Stream Processing service, data
collation service
Containers and VM
Cloud NoSQL Columnar database VM and Containers
Cloud Dashboard and monitoring ser-
vice
Containers
Table 3.1: Services and elastic infrastructure in the GPON scenario
3.2.1 Platform and infrastructure services
Each subsystem consists of multiple platform services that interact among them-
selves through internal/external network layer. These platform services are de-
ployed on an infrastructure service with elastic capabilities for proper manage-
ment of resources. The various microservices along with the elastic infrastructure
services involved in these subsystems are summarized in Table 3.1.
This GPON monitoring provisioning can be found in the IoTCloudSamples1
repository [77].
3.2.1.1 Elasticity of services
The platform services are scaled through elastic infrastructure service units. We
present the scope of elasticity of the two different elastic infrastructure service units
(containers and VM) indicated in Table 3.1. Containers can be scaled vertically
and horizontally by allocating more resources such as memory, CPU, etc. These
containerized platform services can be scaled horizontally by creating additional
containers. For example, we can add extra nodes to the stream processing services
by creating extra container and connecting the worker nodes with the master node.
VMs on the other hand support vertical scaling only.
3.2.2 Stakeholders
We have identified the following three stakeholders in the GPON monitoring sys-
tem:
 Developers: They are responsible for creating and maintaining the platform
services across the edge and cloud subsystem. Additionally, they are also
1https://github.com/rdsea/IoTCloudSamples/tree/master/scenarios/netops





























Figure 3.2: Services, interactions and stakeholders in the GPON monitoring sce-
nario
responsible for deploying these platform services on respective infrastructure
services. That is, they also fulfil the role of DevOps.
 Cloud Service Provider (CSP): They provide the necessary resources
upon which the developers build and deploy their platform services. The
infrastructure service can be provided as IaaS, PaaS, SaaS [62] depending on
the developers requirements.
 Consumers: They are the GPON users i.e. the ones responsible for deploy-
ing and maintaining the IoT subsystem. In the case of GPON scenario, they
are the ISPs using the IoT devices and using the monitoring infrastructure
on the cloud and edge subsystems.
Figure 3.2 shows a high-level representation of the various stakeholders, services
and interactions in the GPON monitoring system.































Figure 3.3: Use-cases in the GPON monitoring systems
3.2.3 Elasticity needs and ZTA approach
We briefly outlined the elasticity needs of the scenario in Section 3.2.1.1. In the
GPON scenario, the elasticity needs are driven to maintain an acceptable level of
all the monitoring platform services. For example, to maintain the QoS for the
consumer, the IIoT developer could request to scale-up the edge brokers. If there
are not enough requests, the IIoT developer can scale down the number of brokers
while maintaining SLA of latency required by the consumer.
In this scenario, through the use of ZTA, the elasticity operation can be policed
through a centralized PEP by stakeholders. That is, the elasticity operations of all
the infrastructure services (docker or VM) in all the subsystems will go through
PEP and will only be allowed if trusted. This gives the advantage of a) increase
trust by denying implicit elasticity at all points and b) reduce domain expert’s
intervention at multiple locations thereby ensuring easier SLA compliance.
3.2.4 GPON monitoring system use-cases
We present a few use-cases in the GPON monitoring system, and its interaction
with the framework. Through these use-cases, we attempt to gather requirements
of a ZTA based framework that supports docker container and VM type infras-
tructure service. We also delineate the stakeholder and alternate scenario for a
proper understanding. Figure 3.3 presents an use-case diagram of the use-cases
described for the GPON scenario.
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ID GPON-UC-01




The cloud broker wants to request additional resources
due to edge broker poisoning
Event Type Malicious Event
Pre-conditions
 Unsecured edge broker has been attacked by a mali-
cious entity
 The attacker is publishing random values into the
GPON monitoring at edge broker
Activities
 The message broker at edge requests additional in-
stance of vertical resource such as memory to the
cloud infrastructure
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the load on edge
broker and the number of sensors.
 The policy enforcement point denies the request
End-state
 The request of cloud broker to get more resources is
denied
Alternative Activi-
ties  We model the total expected memory required based
on expert experience
 Fix this maximum allocated container memory using
“--memory=*” flag
Table 3.2: GPON use-case GPON-UC-01
It can be seen that the alternate flow scenario prevents altering memory al-
location rules dynamically and that this memory allocation is not based on any
security policy.
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ID GPON-UC-02




The edge broker requests additional resources
Event Type Benign Event
Pre-conditions
 There has been an increase in GPON sensor publish-
ing rate during peak times
Activities
 The message broker at edge requests additional in-
stance of horizontal resource that is, an extra con-
tainer instance
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the time of re-
quest and number of sensors connected with the secu-
rity policies.
 The policy enforcement point accepts the request
End-state
 The request of edge broker to get more resources is
accepted
 A new managed instance of edge broker is spawned
Alternative Activi-
ties  We fix the total expected load on the system based on
sensors and time data.
 The edge nodes are provided these details while boot-
strapping
Table 3.3: GPON use-case GPON-UC-02
In the alternative flow of this use-case, the stakeholder is unable to easily
manage, share or update the security rules compared to the main scenario of using
a centralized point.
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ID GPON-UC-03
Title Cloud database scale-up request
Stakeholders Developers and CSPs
Problem State-
ment
A new cloud database rack needs to be spawned
Event Type Malicious Event
Pre-conditions
 Unsecured cloud broker has been attacked by a mali-
cious entity
 The attacker is publishing random values into the
GPON monitoring at cloud broker
 The NoSQL database needs to spawn a new VM in-
stance to store all the extra data
Activities
 The cloud database requests additional instance of
horizontal resource that is, an extra VM rack instance
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the number of
sensors connected and total ingestion for that specific
day.
 The policy enforcement point denies the request
End-state
 The request of cloud database to get more VM in-
stance rack is denied
Alternative Activi-
ties  We configure the security policy for a VM instance
update in the terraform resource provider file
 The database is scaled up according to these ”local”
policies
Table 3.4: GPON use-case GPON-UC-03
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ID GPON-UC-04
Title Cloud message consumer scale down request
Stakeholders Developers and Consumers
Problem State-
ment
An instance of Kafka consumer belonging to a same
consumer-group but different partition requests to scale
down
Event Type Benign Event
Pre-conditions
 Some geo-partitioned edge nodes are unable to tem-
porarily publish onto the cloud
 There is a backlog of data on on edge message bro-
ker that will be immediately published after the edge
node’s link goes back up.
Activities
 The cloud consumer requests to remove instance of
horizontal resource
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the backlog on
the edge nodes and matches with the total ingestion
on an average day.
 The policy enforcement point denies the request
End-state
 The request of cloud message broker to scale-down is
denied
Alternative Activi-
ties  We fix the number of cloud brokers on edge at any
given time and day.
 There is no dynamic elasticity due to geo-partitioning
Table 3.5: GPON use-case GPON-UC-04
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ID GPON-UC-05
Title Provide additional resources to analytics service
Stakeholders Developers and CSPs
Problem State-
ment
Apache Spark requests additional memory resources to
maintain QoS levels
Event Type Benign Event
Pre-conditions
 This is followed by GPON-UC-04
 Since there is flood of data after GPON-UC-04,
Apache Sparks needs extra memory resources to
maintain SLA level QoS guarantees.
Activities
 The cloud analytics service requests additional hori-
zontal instances of worker nodes
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks if there has been
an increase in throughput from database and con-
sumers.
 The policy enforcement point accepts the request
End-state
 The request of cloud analytics service to scale-up hor-
izontally is accepted
Alternative Activi-
ties  We estimate the number of spark worker nodes on
cloud.
 We deploy the ability to scale up and down depending
on the load on Apache Spark independently from edge
nodes.
Table 3.6: GPON use-case GPON-UC-05
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3.3 Scenario: ML video inference system
The second scenario is of real-time ML object detection edge-cloud system. This
scenario deals with detecting the count and the types of object in a given video
frame. The stakeholder can use this information for a number of purpose such
as security surveillance or management of crowd. This scenario of ML offloading
elasticity is popularly seen in large-scale video analytics researches such as Fil-
terforward [12]2 and [28]. There is elasticity in offloading of inference between
edge and cloud. High-accuracy, high-latency inferences are performed on cloud
whereas low-accuracy, low-latency inference is done on edge server. This scenario
utilizes an edge-cloud continuum with the DNN object detection models situated
on both edge and cloud. In this specific scenario, TinyYOLO [64] object detection
for Darknet3 framework is used. For this thesis, we have developed the deploy-
ment manifests, k3s scheduling strategy (refer to Appendix B.1) and custom web
services to interact with Darknet object detection framework.
In this thesis, we only focus on improving trust of elastic offloading operations
between edge and cloud. That is, we are interested in supporting stakeholders
to deal with contextual cases where untrusted operations can change the output
results and the latency SLA requirements.
The method of interaction with external customers is similar to popular ML
SaaS products such as Google’s Vision AI4 and Azure Vision API5. To perform the
inference, each tenet needs to use the REST API service. The input to this service
is an image whereas the output is the number and names of objects detected in
this image along with the coordinates and confidence. A ML inference engine
(and trained model) sits on the edge device as well as cloud. Next, we describe
the different platform services and computing infrastructure services deployed on
this system along with the elasticity needs and ZTA support.
3.3.1 Platform and infrastructure services
3.3.1.1 Platform services
The ML model is deployed on a cluster of edge devices and one cloud worker.
Apart from inference engine, the edge cluster serves a message broker for intra-
pod metadata communication, a ML data pre-processing service and an externally
exposed web server for client communication. All the requests and inferences are
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Figure 3.4: Services and interactions in the ML video inference system
cloud worker. The overall workflow can be seen in Figure 3.4. The intra-service
communication within the cluster happens through appropriate REST API calls,
whereas the message broker is used to check status of requests and deliver results
(internally).
3.3.1.2 Deployment infrastructure
The deployment infrastructure on edge comprise of elastic state-of-the-art con-
tainer orchestration framework (k3s6). We also have a controller node on cloud
that controls these edges and cloud subsystem nodes. This scenario adds special
diversity to our use-cases since unlike the GPON monitoring scenario, there is
direct interaction between the various edge devices.
The various subsystems, platform services and the corresponding infrastructure
services involved in this ML inference system is presented in Table 3.7.
3.3.1.3 Elasticity between the services
We present the sequence of dataflow and elasticity operations in Figure 3.5. The
Figure 3.5(a) presents the sequence of request (and response) flow whereas the
6https://k3s.io/














































Figure 3.5: Sequence and Activity diagram for the ML video inference system
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Subsystem Platform service units Infrastructure ser-
vice unit




Edge and Cloud Web server, Pre-processing ser-




Cloud NoSQL database Containers
Table 3.7: Services and elastic infrastructures in the ML video inference scenario
activity diagram in Figure 3.5(b) shows the decision-making behind the elasticity
operations at various nodes.
It can be seen from the activity diagram that the edge nodes can either offload
inference requests to another (stronger) edge node. Additionally, they can offload
the requests to cloud subsystem if they determine that even heavier inference
computation is required. Here the elasticity operations therefore include elastic
offloading as well as horizontal and vertical scaling.
3.3.2 Stakeholders
We have identified the following three stakeholders in the ML video inference
system. While they are similar to ones we discussed in GPON scenario, their
roles, stakes, and interactions are different.
 Developers: They are responsible for creating and maintaining the platform
services across the edge and cloud subsystem including the ML inference
services. Additionally, they are also responsible for deploying these platform
services. That is, they also fulfil the role of DevOps. Since our scenario
focuses on an inference platform only, we assume our developers receive a
pre-trained ML model and just deploy them to appropriate edge and cloud
nodes.
 Cloud Service Provider (CSP): They provide that necessary resources
upon which the developers build and deploy their services. In this case, this
infrastructure is provided as a node and pod managed container orchestration
cluster of k3s.
 Consumers: They are the ML inference service users i.e. the ones respon-
sible actually consuming the external APIs. They are typically under SLA
agreements with the developer stakeholders that govern the latency, QoS
accuracy guarantees.





























Figure 3.6: Use-cases in the ML video inference systems
3.3.3 ML video inference system use-cases
Through the use of our use-cases, we attempt to gather requirements of our ZTA
based framework. We also delineate the stakeholder and alternate scenario for a
proper understanding. Figure 3.6 presents an use-case diagram of the use-cases
described for the ML video inference scenario.
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ID MLVI-UC-01
Title Provide extra pods for ML inference service on edge
Stakeholders Developers and CSP
Problem State-
ment
The ML inference service requests for additional instances
of pods from the k3s environment
Event Type Benign Event
Pre-conditions
 This is the most basic case
 The heuristic has determined the inference be per-
formed on edge subsystem
 There is a peak load and to maintain the desired QoS,
the ML inference service asks for instances of edge
pods.
Activities
 The edge inference service requests additional pods on
edge worker k3s nodes
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks if there has been
an increase in requests on the web-server and pre-
processor.
 The policy enforcement point accepts the request
End-state
 The request of ML inference service to scale-up hori-
zontally is accepted
Alternative Activi-
ties  Enable the kubernetes Horizontal Pod Autoscaler
(HPA).
 While deploying the ML inference service, provide the
topology and maximum permissible load on the pod.
Table 3.8: ML video inference use-case MLVI-UC-01
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ID MLVI-UC-02
Title Prevent forceful inference offloading
Stakeholders Developers and CSP
Problem State-
ment
The attacker sends malicious data for inference and in-
crease computation cost
Event Type Malicious Event
Pre-conditions
 During night-time, the attacker sends specially crafted
videos to increase computation
 Due to the specially crafted data, heuristic has falsely
identified the inference be offloaded to cloud subsys-
tem
Activities
 The edge inference service requests to offload infer-
ence request onto already running pods on cloud
worker k3s node
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the time of re-
quest. During night the probability of large human
gathering is low.
 The policy enforcement point rejects the request
End-state
 The request of edge ML inference service to offload
the work on cloud is rejected
Alternative Activi-
ties  Fix the time duration during which the edge can re-
quest offloading onto cloud.
Table 3.9: ML video inference use-case MLVI-UC-02
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ID MLVI-UC-03
Title Prevent offloading despite consumer’s elasticity SLA vio-
lation
Stakeholders Consumers and developers
Problem State-
ment
The ML inference on edge does not offload the data to the
cloud
Event Type Benign Event
Pre-conditions
 The consumer’s requests higher accuracy inference
 The inference engine request the inference to be of-
floaded onto the cloud.
Activities
 The edge inference service requests to offload infer-
ence request onto already running pods on cloud
worker k3s node
 The elasticity request goes to a centralized resource
policy enforcement point
 The policy enforcement point checks the time of re-
quest. During night the probability of large human
gathering is low.
 The policy enforcement point rejects the request
End-state
 The request of edge ML inference service to offload
the work on cloud is rejected resulting in an lower
accuracy than agreed in the SLA
Alternative Activi-
ties  Fix the priority of request allowed to every tenet to
maintain the SLA level accuracy to the consumer.
Table 3.10: ML video inference use-case MLVI-UC-03
This is one such use-case where the policy enforcement point takes a wrong
decision resulting in an lower accuracy than agreed with the consumer.
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3.4 Requirements
In this section, we gather and extract the requirements from the use-cases of
the two scenarios presented above. Through these requirements, we will quan-
tify concrete functional and non-functional requirements that our framework must
support. This will ensure that the models (such as data model, process model
and the threat models) that we design and implement for ZETA are accurate and
represent a real-world functionally usable product. It will also provide a baseline
against which the final framework can be evaluated.
We present complete and singular requirements through a bunch of requirement
tables. We will then proceed to indicate how each of these requirements satisfy
one or more of the use-cases mentioned above.
3.4.1 Requirement tables
The requirements syntax and definitions are used as per the latest approved ISO–
29148-2018 §5.2.1[1]. Each of these requirements table has an unique require-
ment ID, the title of requirement, a short explanation of requirement, the type
(functional/non-functional) and the requirements that it depends on.
ID RQ-01
Title Elasticity enforcement via PEP
Description All the elasticity operations of the system shall only take
place after they have been approved by the PEP of the
framework. It ensures the ZTA compliance of the system
through the use of our framework.
Type Functional
Depends on –
Table 3.11: Elasticity enforcement via PEP RQ-01
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ID RQ-02
Title Request security
Description The ZETA framework shall ensure that all the requests
from the system’s services are authenticated, encrypted
and non-tampered (integrity). That is, the elasticity re-
quests coming to and the response going out to the services
from the ZETA framework must follow the three basic
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) goals.
Type Functional
Depends on –
Table 3.12: Request authentication requirement RQ-02
ID RQ-03
Title Rule-based authorization
Description The ZETA framework shall ensure that the elasticity re-
quests are approved/denied based on rules. The policy
administrator shall first perform rule matching and then




Table 3.13: Rule-based authorization RQ-03
ID RQ-04
Title Framework data model
Description The ZETA framework and the tokens shall follow pre-
defined data models. This must include the request data
model that a service uses, and the rule data model that
the policy administrator and stakeholders must use.
Type Functional
Depends on RQ-02, RQ-03
Table 3.14: Framework data model requirement RQ-04
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ID RQ-05
Title Transferable elasticity capabilities
Description The framework should be platform agnostic and must al-
low the an infrastructure service to request elastic capa-
bilities on behalf of another infrastructure service. The
framework’s techniques must ensure trust even after trans-
fer of elastic capabilities.
Type Functional
Depends on –
Table 3.15: Transferable elasticity capabilities requirement RQ-05
ID RQ-06
Title Computing trust on context capture
Description Computing the trust must take into consideration the con-
text of the elasticity request as well as other (monitoring)
metrics captured and saved in the framework
Type Functional
Depends on RQ-03, RQ-04, RQ-05
Table 3.16: Contextual trust-level computation requirement RQ-06
ID RQ-07
Title Dynamic policy administrator reconfiguration
Description The rules defined in the policy administrator of the ZETA
framework shall be configurable at the runtime. That is,
the stakeholder must be able configure the rules and trust
levels without the need to restart the framework.
Type Non-Functional
Depends on RQ-03, RQ-05
Table 3.17: Dynamic policy administrator reconfiguration requirement RQ-07
CHAPTER 3. TRUSTED ELASTICITY REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 49
ID RQ-08
Title Policy administrator rule customizable
Description The rules defined in the policy administrator of the ZETA
framework shall be customizable at the runtime. That is,
the stakeholder must be able customize the rules and add
custom parameters on top of existing ones. The stake-
holder may be able to change the priority and hierarchy
of the rule.
Type Non-Functional
Depends on RQ-04, RQ-07
Table 3.18: Policy administrator rule customizable requirement RQ-08
ID RQ-09
Title Framework availability and distributed
Description The framework shall be available and distributed to pro-
vide fault-tolerance. The latency of the response must also
be in order of seconds.
Type Non-Functional
Depends on RQ-01, RQ-03
Table 3.19: Framework availability and latency RQ-09
From the use-cases, we analyse a total of nine requirements. Out of these nine,
six are functional requirements and are associated with all the use-cases. These
functional requirements (RQ-01 to RQ-06) form the basis of the framework and
define the scope of the operations and interactions with the framework. They can
be further classified as two types. The first ones improve the trust between service
and framework and include RQ-01, RQ-02, RQ-03 and RQ-06. For example, RQ-02
ensures that the requests to scale up the message broker in the GPON scenario is
secure and therefore increases trust between the microservice and our framework.
Other functional requirement such as add structure to the framework and include
RQ-04 and RQ-05. RQ-04 guarantees that all the data, requests and interaction
follow a standard model across all the infrastructure services.
There are three non-functional requirements that we have identified. They are
features that the framework must support to a) improve the ease of use, and b)
provide flexibility and support a wider variety of infrastructure services through
customizations.
Table 3.20 shows the requirement association with the use-cases. The first
six functional requirements are associated with all use-cases. It is important to
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Table 3.20: Requirement association with use-case
note here are we have highlighted only strong association of a use-case with a
requirement in the Table 3.20. For example, RQ-08 is strongly associated with use-
case MLVI-UC-02 as the stakeholder will need a custom field component (time) in
their rules. Whereas for MLVI-UC-01 most of the rules will not require a custom
field (although some may!) and hence there is no strong association.
Through the ZETA framework along with our proposed interaction model,
we support requirements from RQ-01 to RQ-08. That is, we support all the
requirements except RQ-09. We partially support RQ-09 by providing low-latency
guarantees but not availability guarantees.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced two real-world scenarios and presented their stake-
holders, types of deployment infrastructure and use-cases. All these use-cases
require some element of zero-trust based framework to ensure an improved degree
of trust in elasticity operations. Through these use-cases, we defined and analysed
the functional and non-functional requirements of our framework. These require-
ments ensure a define constraint onto our framework to solve “real” problems while
maintaining applicability to a wide variety of services and scenarios.
Chapter 4
Models, design and implementation
4.1 Overview
In the previous chapter (Chapter 3) we delineated the functional and non-functional
requirements of the ZETA framework. To increase the trust of elasticity opera-
tions in edge-cloud microservices and utilize the concept of ZTA, the design of our
framework must fulfil these requirements.
This chapter presents the design of our framework and describes the compo-
nents involved. The interaction models in this chapter describe how the infras-
tructure services can use our framework. We formally present the models of trust
and elasticity that we use in our edge-cloud scenarios. We also define the scope of
elasticity and trust. Additionally, we describe the internal models such as the data
model, evaluation model, etc. It introduces the workflow of interaction between an
infrastructure service and the framework. Finally, we provide the implementation
details and the choice of technologies involved in the framework.
4.2 Model of elasticity and trust
4.2.1 Model of elasticity
Our work in this thesis will focus on the resource elasticity and elasticity is always
measured in terms of resources. All the requirements of our framework and the
various use-cases will revolve around resource elasticity. The level of elasticity
will focus on service units (refer to Section 2.2.1.2). Hence, the elasticity will
be measured in resource allocated to individual units. An example of resource
elasticity at service unit level is the variation of memory allocation to a message
broker microservice.
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Threat Model
Assumptions
+ Access to network data
+ External access to all system services
+ Internal access to one system service
- No access to framework services 
Goals
+ Attack elastic infrastructure
+ Increase resource consumption
+ Cause SLA/SLI  voilations
Capabilities
+ Interact with all the system services
+ Send/receive data and requests
+ CE/EOP on one system service
Figure 4.1: Threat model for the ZETA framework
4.2.2 Model of trust
Our work in this thesis revolves around explicit trust in the elasticity operations.
That is, the determination of trust for trusted-elasticity is done through a trusted
third-party. Through trusted-elasticity, we attempt to increase the trust in the
resource elasticity requests in edge-cloud platform services. Since our choice of
increasing trust is explicit, we attempt to achieve it by creating a trusted third-
party framework for the validation of resource elasticity.
In our model of trusted-elasticity, the provider (in most cases it will be the
CSP) of ZETA defines three trust level boundaries which are HIGH, MEDIUM and
LOW. These trust levels can be controlled at run-time by the provider through trust
configurations. On the other hand, the trust requirement of every platform service
can be granularly customized by the tenet through configuration data and policies
provided to the ZETA framework. However, they are bound to one of the three
trust levels. For example, the provider can define a trust score of greater than 80
as HIGH. Whereas, a tenet’s policy specifies that platform service X requires HIGH
trust level. Therefore, coordination between provider and user is required.
4.3 Threat model
The threat or adversary model provides the constraints under which an attacker
operates. This helps in extracting security requirements and performing evaluation
of the framework’s design. A threat model provides the assumptions under which
an attacker operates, the attacker’s capabilities (in terms of resources, attacks,
etc.), actions, results, and their goals. Figure 4.1 presents the threat model under
which the ZETA framework operates.
Under this threat model, the attacker has access to all the encrypted network
data between the edge-cloud services and ZETA. The attacker can also interact
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freely with all the external (client-facing) platform services. Under this threat
mode, the attacker has complete access to exactly one service and can send elastic-
ity requests (for itself or other platform services) to the framework. Furthermore,
using this “compromised” service, they can interact with all the other services.
This includes sending and receiving data. They can cause arbitrary Arbitrary
Code Execution (ACE) and Escalation Of Privilege (EOP) attacks on this “com-
promised” service.
Our threat model further assumes that ZETA component services are com-
pletely secure and the attacker does not have any internal access to framework
services and can only interact with it using the two public endpoints. These end-
points are generally used by the infrastructure services to send and receive elas-
ticity operations. Finally, the attacker is malicious and aims to increase resource
consumption and disrupt the SLA/SLI of the infrastructure service. Since, this
thesis focuses on using ZTA design paradigm for the microservices, our framework
is designed to minimize the effects on elasticity due to lateral movement and attack
propagation. Hence, such an attack model is reasonable and inline with popular
ZTA threat models1. Ability to interact with all the external platform services
and access to one internal platform service is required to validate effectiveness of
ZTA.
4.4 Design
The framework comprises a collection of components. Figure 4.2 presents a high-
level overview of the components inside the framework. These components are
implemented as microservices. Through these microservices, the ZETA framework
adds ZTA support to distributed platform services.
The framework itself supports communication with platform-agnostic infras-
tructure services. That is, the elasticity request of a platform service can originate
from typical elastic orchestration platforms (such as Kubernetes, Docker2, Open-
shift3, Terraform4). The framework has three externally exposed services and four
internal services. Since, our aim is to handle platform-agnostic requests, all the
external requests are served using REST APIs. One of the cornerstones of the
framework (as well as a functional requirement) is enforcing strong security prim-
1The official NIST special publication on ZTA at [67] discusses the extent of attacker ac-
cess/capabilities when talking about ZTA security models. It states: “Zero trust security models
assume that an attacker is present in the environment and that an enterprise-owned environment
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itives (authentication & authorization) in our elasticity requests and thus all the
requests require presenting a valid JWT token over TLS. To receive a token, valid
credentials need to be provided by any infrastructure service. Using JWT ensures
a wider availability and acceptance of the framework.
4.4.1 Token design
We propose using token based techniques for modelling the interaction between
the elasticity of the platform services. Similar token based approach has been
taken for authorization in extremely popular traditional frameworks such as the
Kerberos [52] and OAuth [37]; and more recently in the “Update Framework” [13].
The auth and elasticity tokens are important component of our interactions. Both
of them are JWT tokens and hence, are easy to use and verify. They are signed
using ES256 algorithm and hence are lightweight to generate and transport. The
jti field is used to prevent replay attacks on the elasticity tokens.
 Auth tokens: They are long-lived token. That is, their lifespan (expiry)
is in order of hours. ZETA generates an auth token with maximum expiry
time as 24 hours. Although the elasticity of the system does not depend on
auth tokens, the time limit is done to mitigate long-duration token passing
attacks. A sample auth token can be seen in Listing 4.1.
 Elasticity tokens: They are short-lived tokens with the expiration limits in
the order of minutes. A constraint of 60 minutes is enforced by the framework
on these tokens. The structure of the elasticity token is similar to auth token
except it has sub field as the service using the elasticity token (deployment
B from the previous example) and aud field as the recipient of the elasticity
token (deployment A from the previous example).
It is important to note that the auth token may constitute of multiple elastic
capabilities, however the elasticity token will be generated for only one capability
at a time.
Listing 4.1: Sample auth token
{
'sub ': 'docker_service ', # subject of the platform service
'iss ': 'zeta ', # issuer
'iat ': 1617239022, # issed at time
'exp ': 1617245122, # expiry time
'jti ': 'fd5r23jKLd5gdf66sdYI9 ', # JWT ID: unique identifier
'capabilities ': ['cpu ', 'memory '],
'type ': 'auth ' # token type
}
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4.4.2 Components
In this section, we briefly describe the capabilities, functions and design of all the
components of ZETA framework.
4.4.2.1 Authentication endpoint
Authentication endpoint is one of the two externally exposed components of the
framework and it provides the gateway for the infrastructure services to interact
with the framework. It is mainly responsible for identification of the infrastructure
service from where the request is originating. Moreover, any infrastructure service
can request for auth token and elasticity token by providing their credentials to this
component. After validation of infrastructure service credentials, it communicates
with the auth component and replies back with the auth token or the elasticity
token.
Any infrastructure service willing use the framework must first provide the
required capabilities and the own credentials in the REST request. As per the
basic HTTP authentication scheme [65], the credentials need to be provided as
‘base64(username:password)’ in the body of the request. Given the modular
design of the framework, support for dedicated certificates can be easily added for
an easier integration with sidecar services. Auth and elasticity token requests can
be seen in Listing 4.3 and Listing 4.4.
Authentication endpoint then validates the credentials from the database and
passes the request to the auth component for token generation. The infrastructure
services requiring the elasticity token need to provide their own credentials and
also the auth token of other platform service. This is done to prevent the malicious
services from requesting auth token on behalf of other platform service.
4.4.2.2 Authorization endpoint
The Authorization endpoint component is responsible for authorizing service and
generating all the tokens. Additionally, it is also responsible for managing and
verifying the token authenticity requests. It is important to note here that it is only
responsible for authorization of capabilities and not validating the authenticity of
requests (which is done by the Authentication endpoint above). To generate the
elasticity token, it communicates with Policy evaluation component, Knowledge
component, and Trust computation component.
The tokens themselves can be validated by any infrastructure/platform service
as they are generated through elliptic curve asymmetric (public-private) key. To
ensure that the resulting signature is lightweight and equally secure, we use 256-
bit elliptic curve instead of 2048 bit RSA pair. Section 4.4.1 discusses the token’s
input parameters.


















Figure 4.2: Components of the ZETA framework
This component first receives the request from service identification compo-
nent. To generate the tokens, it first verifies the data from the database service,
computes trust and policies by calling other components (in case of elasticity to-
ken generation) and finally generates the token. We explain the token generation
workflow in detail in the Section 4.6.
4.4.2.3 Knowledge component
The Knowledge component acts as a central repository for the knowledge about the
platform service capabilities, tokens issued, rules uploaded and trust evaluation.
Moreover, it also has monitoring metrics of these platform services. This knowledge
provides the context for trust evaluation and is used by the trust evaluation
component.
This component contains two types of contextual knowledge. This approach of
capturing knowledge is taken from [53] that presents the BeyondCorp zero-trust
framework.
 Service and Policy knowledge: This provides the context of the platform
services that are involved in the elasticity request. They could be the services
that are requesting the elasticity or the object of elasticity. For example,
if service X and Y are both deployed on same infrastructure, this is one
of the context that trust evaluation component may use. All the service
identification (credentials) and service authorization (tokens) are also saved
as service knowledge. This knowledge is saved as relational knowledge.
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 Observed knowledge: This provides contextual knowledge into the status
of the platform services as well as the infrastucture services, and forms a
very important aspect of the trust evaluation component. For example, in
case of an elasticity request to increase CPU resource, the trust evaluation
component checks the current CPU usage knowledge of the target platform
service and assigns a low trust score if the current CPU usage is low. The
observed knowledge is pulled as telemetry information and are saved as tem-
poral knowledge in database.
4.4.2.4 Policy evaluation component
Policy evaluation component allows the developers to define custom policies. Often
these policies are specific for an organization and hence, this component adds
flexibility in defining custom organization wide rules. While the trust computation
level is defined by the provider, a policy defines how a stakeholder uses the trust
level for their platform service. The input to this component is the rule and the
data uploaded by the stakeholder as well as the trust evaluation result. It is
called by the Authorization endpoint component and is the final point of request
evaluation before the elasticity token is granted.
From our motivating use-cases, allowing the developers to define custom rules
is one of functional requirements of the framework. The rules and related data are
uploaded into the policy knowledge by the stakeholder. We use Rego5 based rules
and JSON based data in the Policy evaluation component. Rego supports struc-
tured JSON document models and integrates well with popular policy evaluation
engines. It is declarative language used for defining policies for microservices such
as [57].
4.4.2.5 User endpoint
This component is responsible for handling the stakeholder requests (such as rules
upload) and managing them into the knowledge component. It provides an inter-
face to the stakeholder in customizing their rules and selecting their trust models.
All the data dealt by this component is managed in the service and policy knowl-
edge context only.
To ensure the ease of use, this component exposes multiple RESTful endpoints
that allows the stakeholder to manage their polices. It relies on basic but trusted
and popular security primitives such as HTTP1.1 “authorization header” for au-
thentication of the users [65].
5https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/
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4.5 Trust computation component
The Trust computation component is a central component of the framework. The
Trust computation component computes a confidence score (and subsequently
trust level) from the contextual knowledge (service and observed) gathered in the
Knowledge component. This trust level is used in the Policy evaluation component
to determine the authorization based on the rule. For example, a stakeholder may
define a rule to authorize elasticity if the trust level is above a certain threshold.
This component also provides extensibility to our framework. That is, it allows
the stakeholder (provider in this case) to replace different trust computation al-
gorithms depending on their requirements. Moreover, through configurations, the
provider can also customize the trust level and adds the flexibility feature of the
framework.
The trust models scores the confidence values of a request on a scale of 0-100.
This value is then changed to a trust level by the component. These trust levels
are LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. We perform this score to level mapping from the table
shown in Table 4.1 which is derived from STIX 2.1 OpenCTI model [19].
It is important to note that the trust computation component only outputs the
trust level from the Table 4.1, whereas the policy evaluation component enforces
it in the request. The default trust level is calculated using the GPR method as
described in the Section 2.2.5. We delineate the exact multi-variate trust level gen-
eration mechanism from the GPR output in Section 4.5.2. However, ZETA gives
complete flexibility to the provider to change the trust parameters and algorithms.
We discuss these techniques in subsequent sections.
4.5.1 Trust parameters and algorithm
Figure 4.3 presents the different subcomponents and the interface of our trust
component. For trust algorithm extensibility, any trust algorithm (custom or
default) needs to implement the TrustAlgorithm interface. The default GPR
algorithm already implements this interface. A custom trust algorithm can be
provided by the stakeholder via the User endpoint component.





Table 4.1: Trust level to confidence score




















Figure 4.3: Interfaces and subcomponents of Trust computation component
The framework provides customizability via configurations. These configura-
tions are used to control the “appropriate” level of trust. Listing 4.2 provides a
sample configuration. There are two types of configurations that the stakeholder
can specify “parameters” and “custom”. These configurations aid in abstracting
the mathematical background required for fine-tuning the trust levels.
“parameters”: They are three pre-defined values that the trust algorithm must
use. a) trust-sentivity: this is between the range 1-10 with 1 being most strict
and 10 being least strict. b) noise: Noise can be one of low, medium or high
and dictates the noise introduced in the training dataset. A higher noise would
mean lower trust boundaries. Finally, c) accuracy is also one of low, medium or
high and dictates the rounds of optimizations used in the code. ZETA maps each
of these values to a specific mathematical number. For example, low accuracy
implies 5 rounds of optimization and low noise value implies 10−2 white noise
addition. We further allow the using “custom” fields into the configuration that
are required by the custom algorithms. They are provided to the custom trust
algorithm during runtime and allows them to algorithm specific customizations.
They are not required if the default classifier is used.
GPR performs non-linear multi-dimensional regression and has more recently
found exploitation in multiple domains [70]. It is especially beneficial for our
use-case as this process a) gives us the probabilistic uncertainties as confidence
intervals and b) performs well for small observed points. Moreover, it is fast
to train a model, perform a regression fit and sample values from this trained
model [63]. For all these reasons, we use GPR for calculating contextual trust.
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Listing 4.2: Sample trust computation configuration
---
t rustAlgor i thm: d e f a u l t g p r
# Specify the model parameters
parameters :
t rus t−s e n s i t i v i t y : 5
no i s e : medium
accuracy: high




4.5.2 Trust level computation algorithm
Our approach models the uncertainties generated from the trained model into
three levels viz Low trust, Medium trust and High trust as defined in the Table 4.1.
To begin the processing, the observed values of any service are pulled from the
observed knowledge base.
The first step is normalization of the values in the scale of [0-100]. We use a






∀x ∈ arr(x) (4.1)
In the next step, we add some noise to the training points is to allow smaller
(instead of zero) trust levels. around the observed points and prevent over-fitting
of the regression curve. The mean is kept as 0 and the noise is then added to the
observed points. The noise level bounds is read from noise parameter. The error
bounds are fixed between 10−10 and 10−1. The final kernel is thus represented
by a summation of RBF and white noise kernel. Finally the GPR is done as per
Equation 2.1 with RBF kernel length as 102 (max output from Equation 4.1).
Moreover, our trust calculation component also adds a white noise kernel that
can represent independent noises in the training data. This is required to prevent
“tight-fitting” of the regression curves around the observed points.
Trustrange = 2
i × ts (1.96σ) , where i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (4.2)
To calculate the trust levels, we utilize the 95% confidence interval whose Z-
score is 1.966. However, as the training point noise is small, the resulting output
6For any standard normal distribution, a variable Z falls between ±1.96 with a 95%
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Algorithm 1 Default trust computation algorithm
Require: xdata, trust-config.yml
Ensure: << TrustAlgorithm >> is implemented
function ModifiedMinMaxNormalization(xarr)
xnorm ← arrempty
for all xi ∈ xarr do




function GetTrustLevel(yr, sd) . Generates the trust level
tlow = 4 ∗ ts ∗ (1.96 ∗ sd)
tmedium = 2 ∗ ts ∗ (1.96 ∗ sd)
thigh = ts ∗ (1.96 ∗ sd)
if |yr| ≤ thigh then
return HIGH
end if
if |yr| > thigh and |yr| ≤ tmedium then
return MEDIUM
end if











′trust− sensitivity′]) . Trust-sensitivity
xnorm = ModifiedMinMaxNormalization(xdata)
kernel = RBF (100, (10−1, 102)) +WN(ns) . From sci-kit learn package
yr, sd = GPR(xnorm, kernel, ac) . Regression from sci-kit learn package
return GetTrustLevel(yr, sd)
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Figure 4.4: GPR regression curve and trust levels for container memory consump-
tion
σ will also be lower. Therefore, we multiply the Confidence Interval (CI) range to
a constant to define smaller trust levels. The final three trust levels are calculated
as per Equation 4.2. Here the σ is sampled out from the GPR trained model and
ts is provided through the trust configuration input as trust-senstivity.
Algorithm 1 presents our default trust level computation algorithm for a single
dimension GPR. In case of multi-dimentional GPR, a weighted average of the
trust levels is taken from all the GPR trust dimensions. Equation 4.3 shows the
calculation of the final trust level score where all the weights have equal values.
Here each xi represents an individual trust level generated from multi-dimensional







The input to the default trust algorithm is time and resource. Prior to re-
gression, the resource usage is normalized as 0–100 (0 representing the minimum
resource utilization and 100 representing maximum resource utilization) through
the ModifiedMinMaxNormalization function in Algorithm 1. All the values above
100 are clipped. Figure 4.4 visualizes a sample single dimension GPR and the cor-
responding trust levels for a docker container memory utilization from the ML
probability. Hence, this is also known as 95% CI Z-score. For more information refer:
https://www1.udel.edu/htr/Statistics/Notes/class13.html
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video inference scenario (For the details on the testbed, elasticity conditions and
testing criteria refer to Section 5.2). It shows the ranges of the three trust levels
and how the confidence score would decrease when a value is sampled at a larger
distance from the regression curve.
4.6 Interaction flows
Usage of our framework requires multiple workflows such as generation of tokens,
observed knowledge capture and rule management by the stakeholder. This section
presents the activities carried out by the framework to complete these workflows.
The two more important workflows are the generation of authentication and elas-
ticity tokens, and they require complex interaction of different components in the
framework.
4.6.1 Auth token generation workflow
Generation of auth token involves the interaction between authentication and au-
thorization components. Figure 4.5 shows the activities and interaction of these
components. The steps involved are:
(a) The infrastructure service first generates a request for the auth token along
with the capabilities. It also needs to provide its own credentials in this
request. A sample request body can be seen in Listing 4.1.
(b) The Authentication endpoint component first validates the credentials from
the Knowledge component. If the credentials don’t match, an error response
is sent back.
(c) The Authentication endpoint component sends the request to the Authoriza-
tion endpoint component. The Authorization endpoint component checks if
the capabilities by the service are allowed by the stakeholder. It is a basic
check and is done directly with the knowledge component.
(d) The Authorization endpoint component generates a valid JWT auth token
along with valid fields (refer to Listing 4.3) and signs it private key. This
is sent back as a response to the Authentication endpoint component which
returns it to the infrastructure service.
(e) The generated auth token and some metadata token (such as time of genera-
tion, service id) is parallelly saved into the (service) Knowledge component.
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Figure 4.5: Workflow for the generation of auth token
4.6.2 Elasticity token generation workflow
Figure 4.6 presents the activities inside the components of the framework that
occur during the elasticity token generation workflow. As described earlier, the
elasticity token generation request is done by infrastructure services and they need
to present the auth token to receive the elasticity token. The steps involved are:
(a) The infrastructure service generates the elasticity request and sends this
request to Authentication endpoint component along with the auth token
that it received from the target infrastructure service.
(b) The Authentication endpoint component checks the credentials of the infras-
tructure service from the Knowledge component. And similar to the auth
token, if the credentials do not match, it returns an error message.
(c) Next the request is sent to Authorization endpoint component. It first val-
idates the Authorization token (including checking for expiry etc). If there
is some issue with the validation, the Authentication endpoint component
returns an error message to the infrastructure service.
(d) Upon successful validation, the Authorization endpoint component sends a



































Figure 4.6: Workflow for the generation of elasticity token
request to the Trust computation component which calculates and returns a
confidence score (refer to Table 4.1).
(e) The Authorization endpoint component next fetches the policy knowledge
from the Knowledge component and sends a request to the Policy evaluation
component along with the policy and confidence score.
(f) The Policy evaluation component evaluates the rules uploaded by the stake-
holders and the confidence score and returns its decision.
(g) If the decision is negative, the Authentication endpoint component returns
error response.
(h) If the policy decision is positive, the Authorization endpoint component gen-
erates a valid JWT elasticity token and with the capabilities and signs it
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private key. This is sent back as a response to the Authentication endpoint
component which returns it to the infrastructure service.
(i) The elasticity token is also saved into the Knowledge component for future
trust evaluation.
There are two smaller workflows for the policy evaluation and confidence score
generation.
 Calculating trust: The trust calculation component performs two activi-
ties to generate the confidence score. It first fetches the observed and service
knowledge from the knowledge component. It then uses one of the appro-
priate GPR to calculate the score. The framework supports every trust al-
gorithm as plugin (currently only GPR is implemented) and the stakeholder
can use any one of them.
 Evaluating policy: The policy evaluation component is a single step pro-
cess. Both the policy and the confidence score are pushed by the autho-
rization component. The policy engine evaluates the policy and returns a
boolean result.
4.6.3 Knowledge workflow
To capture context, a period-based pull monitoring technique is used. We use
popular monitoring tools to capture the observed knowledge. In this monitor-
ing technique, the monitoring tool’s server (agent node), periodically fetches the
metrics from the infrastructure service (monitored node). We use pull based mon-
itoring as it provides improved security as compared to other event-driven/push
based monitoring techniques [75].
The observed knowledge workflow has two aspects :
(a) An agent collects the infrastructure service metrics and logs and pushes them
into the observed knowledge component.
(b) Whenever the trust component wishes to use this knowledge, it uses queries
to fetch this saved data.
4.6.4 Rule management workflow
This workflow is done by the stakeholder to perform CRUD operations on the rules.
As mentioned earlier, the rules are of two types, policy rules and user-specific rules.
Policy rules are provided to this component as Rego policies. User-specific rules
are provided as simple JSON objects.
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The User endpoint component receives request, does some basic validations and
pushes/updates/deletes the data in the Knowledge component and the response
(success/failure) is returned to the user.
4.7 Interaction model
The interaction model defines the interaction of infrastructure services among each
other and with the framework for elastic resource request. It also delineates the
techniques that they utilize for elastic resource request with other homogenous or
heterogeneous infrastructure services.
4.7.1 Interaction model – “Removing trust from elastic-
ity”
Our interaction model requires that the elasticity operations only take place if
the infrastructure service is presented with appropriate authorization token. This
cryptographically verifiable token is issued by our framework and represents the
elasticity capabilities (and scope) of a particular infrastructure service. Next, we
describe three different interaction situations on how the framework (and tokens)
ensures ZTA compliance with integrity in the elasticity of the infrastructure service.
4.7.1.1 Single infrastructure service (self-elasticity)
Using tokens for self-elasticity on a single infrastructure service is straightforward.
First the infrastructure service gets the auth token and the verification public key
from the framework that represents its elastic capabilities. Next, if the service
want to scale-up or down, it will send a request for the elasticity token along with
the auth token. At this point, the trust is calculated and results (elasticity token)
returned. Next the service can optionally request the verification of the elasticity
token before scaling up or down. Figure 4.7 shows one such example of interaction
between the infrastructure service (docker) and framework.
4.7.1.2 Multiple services on a heterogeneous infrastructure
Figure 4.8 presents a sample interaction of two services (and the framework) and
delegation of elastic request capabilities to another service on a different infras-
tructure service by a deployment (deployment A). Deployment A first receives the
auth token and the public key to verify this token from the framework. This auth
token is then shared with another infrastructure (deployment B) over ‘data plane’.
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Figure 4.7: Single infrastructure service interaction with the framework
The deployment B can now present this token to the framework to receive the elas-
ticity token for deployment A. The ZETA framework computes the trust, checks
the policies and issues the elasticity token. To request elasticity in deployment A,
deployment B can then send out this elasticity token to deployment A.
In accordance with the ZTA principle, the Deployment A must only scale up
when it receives the “elasticity” token from Deployment B. Deployment B can get
the elasticity token if it has a) the auth token from deployment A and b) gets
trusted by the framework. Similar to the previous scenario, the deployment A
can optionally ask the framework to verify the elasticity token before elasticity
operation. This is to support use-cases where deployment A wants to verify the
status of the public key (expired/revoked/rotated).
4.7.1.3 Multiple services on homogenous infrastructure
This type of interaction requires transfer of the authorization JWT token between
a single but distributed infrastructure service. These services operate under same
domain i.e. they may be able to provision their resources from the same system.
The interaction in this case is very similar to the previous case (see Figure 4.8)
however, the auth token’s transfer does not occur over data plane, but over con-
trol plane. The framework’s trust computation service takes this context into
consideration while issuing elasticity tokens.
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Figure 4.8: Heterogeneous deployments interaction with the framework
4.8 Implementation
This section presents the details of the framework implementation. The imple-
mentation of our framework follows a microservice architecture. Microservice ar-
chitecture is based on the principle of shared-nothing and leverages the message
passing mechanisms of distributed systems for communication of data [69]. Using
this architectural design paradigm gives us the benefit of loosely coupled, reusable
and independently deployable (and maintainable!) pieces of code [5]. In our im-
plementation, each of the component (from Figure 4.2) is created as exactly one
microservice except for the Knowledge component. The Knowledge component
saves the two different types of knowledge (observed and service) into two sepa-
rate microservices.
Before presenting the implementation details of the framework, some finer de-
tails of the implementation are described:
 Programming language: All the components have been programmed in
Python7 v3.8. It provides object-oriented features along with dynamically
7https://www.python.org
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typed syntax. This significantly eliminates writing down boilerplate code
during development.
 Package management: The framework uses pip8 package manager for
installation and management of python libraries.
 Container Management: All the components are build and deployed as
containers to facilitate platform independent execution. Our framework uses
Docker to build, install, manage and run container images of the framework.
 Version Control: Git9 was used as a decentralized version control system.
Next, we discuss the implementation of the components in detail.
4.8.1 Authentication endpoint component
The Authentication endpoint component comprise of two endpoints. That is,
/auth and /elasticity endpoints. All the requests are made as RESTful JSON
objects. A sample request to /auth service can be seen in Listing 4.3. A corre-
sponding /elasticity service request is presented in Listing 4.4. Flask REST
library is used to provide the web server for services.
Listing 4.3: Sample auth token request
{
'service_name ': 'database_service ',
'duration ': '10h',
'credentials ': 'cm9oaXQ6cGFzc3dvcmQ=',
'capabilities_requested ': [memory, cpu]
}
Listing 4.4: Sample elasticity token request
{
'target_service_name ': 'database_service ',
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Note that in Listing 4.4, the request duration is shorter, the auth_token_field
is present and the capabilities are a subset of auth request.
4.8.2 Authorization endpoint component
The Authorization endpoint component generates the authorization token and
elasticity token and has two endpoints that are /auth and /elasticity respec-
tively. The GET requests are used to create tokens while POST is used to validate
them. To query the service knowledge database, psycops210 library is used. Fi-
nally, it calls the trust computation service and policy evaluation service through
REST calls.
To generate the token, this component creates the JWT claims as shown in
Listing 4.5. It is important to note that auth tokens claims are automatically
validated before the elasticity tokens are generated.
Listing 4.5: Python snippet to create JWT claims
1 # Add capabilities to reflect what this JWT token can do
2 return {
3 "exp" : datet ime . utcnow ( ) + t imede l ta ( hours=exp i ry ) ,
4 "nbf" : datet ime . utcnow ( ) ,
5 "aud" : [ f "tefa:{service_name}" ] ,
6 "cf" : c l a ims
7 }
4.8.3 Knowledge component
The knowledge component consists of two different types of knowledge source.
Therefore, there are two different services that are used for their implementation.
The service & policy knowledge consists relational data to store the tokens,
services and policies. These mapping and relations between these data can be
one-to-one (a tenet to a policy), or many-to-one (platform service to all the auth
tokens or elasticity tokens). Hence, to save the service and policy knowledge, a re-
lational database is preferable. In ZETA framework, PostgreSQL11 is used. It is an
open source relational database that supports Atomicity Consistency Isolation and
Durability (ACID) transactions and Structured Query Language (SQL)-2016 [47]
10https://www.psycopg.org/docs/
11https://www.postgresql.org/
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Listing 4.6: Sample tenet uploaded Rego policy
package zeta
import data . zeta framework . c l i e n t 1
default t r u s t c l i e n t 1 = f a l s e
t r u s t c l i e n t 1 {
t r u s t := input . t r u s t
c l i e n t 1 . t r u s t == t r u s t
c l i e n t 1 . se rv ice name == "edge-inference -server"
input . time > 10
}
complaint queries. The observed knowledge is a time-series data and InfluxDB12.
The telemetry data into InfluxDB can be pull via telgraf server-agent plugin.
4.8.4 Policy evaluation component
The policy evaluation component comprise a web-server for handling API requests
and Open Policy Agent (OPA)13 as the general purpose policy evaluation engine.
OPA is a state-of-art and popular choice for policy evaluation in cloud-native en-
vironments. In ZETA, OPA works in input overload mode which is recommended
for local and dynamic data. The user-endpoint component is used to add and
update the stakeholder specific data. The client data bundle is partitioned on
per-tenet basis and uploaded as JSON.
Policy evaluation component evaluates the policy uploaded by the user with
the output from trust-evaluation component. The output from trust-evaluation
component is read from overloaded input parameter whereas client specific data is
fetched from the data bundle. The policy language is Rego and Listing 4.6 presents
a simple rule from an uploaded policy. Listing 4.7 provides a sample tenet specific
data evaluated by the policy.
12https://www.influxdata.com/
13https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/
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4.8.5 Trust computation component
The default trust computation component implements the <<TrustAlgorithm>>
interface and is a direct implementation of the trust algorithm defined in Algo-
rithm 1. We use Scikit-learn [56] only to determine kernel and perform GPR. As
with all other components, the trust can be calculated through appropriate REST
API calls on confidence endpoints. As per the workflow, it is triggered by the
Authorization endpoint component.
4.9 Summary
This chapter takes a deep-dive into the ZETA framework. Our interaction model
provides a secure way of establishing trust along with delegation of elasticity ca-
pabilities using lightweight JWT token. This interaction model supports a diverse
homogenous and heterogeneous infrastructure services.
In this chapter we further delineate the components of the framework that work
together to these tokens. Together with the interaction within these components,
there exists a complex workflow that includes computation of trust, evaluation of
policies and dataflow into knowledge bases. We further discuss the extensibility
extensibility of the framework by allowing the stakeholder to implement a custom
trust algorithm and fine-tune it. These configurations also aid in abstracting the
mathematical background required for fine-tuning the trust. Finally, this chapter




This chapter presents an evaluation of the zero-trust elasticity framework designed
in the previous chapters. The validation of the design is done on two real-world
motivating examples presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.2. The trust configuration
variation on these two contrasting scenarios validate our claim of fine-tuning and
extensibility of ZETA on varied use-cases.
We further demonstrate the usefulness of the framework by performance eval-
uation and quantifying the end-to-end latency guarantees. Finally, we discuss the
evaluation results in the two contrasting scenario and in the context of the scala-
bility of the system. We also model adversary tactics and possible attacks on the
designed framework and the interaction model; and present possible improvements
on the framework.
5.1.1 Evaluation parameters
The evaluation is of two types a) demonstrate contextual trust computation by our
algorithm and ability to fine-tune it through configurations and b) quantification of
resource requirement and scalability by performance evaluation of the framework.
The former is done to demonstrate the framework’s ability to perform contextual
trust computation based on high-level view of the platform services. Additionally,
it also validates the major research objectives i.e. ‘configurability’ of trust levels.
The latter type of evaluation (performance) provides real-world corroboration of
the ZETA framework. That is, it helps in defining the relation between scalability
and resource requirements for using it on a large-scale scenario. We later provide
the interpretation of graphs and discussion of these results.
74
CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION 75
Subsystem Type Hardware Quantity
3 core 2Ghz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
Cloud Master node
4 GiB RAM, 25Gb/s network
1
14 core 2Ghz Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
112 GiB RAM, 10GB/s networkCloud Worker node
16GB NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPGPU
1
Raspberry Pi 4 Model B
Edge Worker node
4GB RAM, 4 core 1.5Ghz CPU
3
Table 5.1: Hardware profile of the ML video inference testbed
5.1.2 Deployment of ZETA framework
We deployed ZETA framework on a VM with each components in a separate docker
container. The resource requirement of ZETA is low and can be easily deployed
on high-end edge devices or a low-end cloud VM. Our choice was deployment a
VM provided by the CSC1. The VM had 4 vCPU and 8GB RAM. The choice of
OS was Ubuntu 20.04 and all the components of the framework were run via a
synchronized docker-compose file. The edge devices from the ML video inference
system could communicate with the framework over public IP whereas the cloud
subsystem can communicate using personal “VNF”. The trust algorithm used for
all the evaluation was the default GPR.
5.2 Scenario I: Elastic ML video inference
5.2.1 Testbed
The ML video inference system testbed has been implemented on state-of-art
elastic technologies to model our testbed with popular computer vision products
such as Azure Vision API2. The distributed testbed cluster comprised of multiple
Raspberry PI model B3 (as edge nodes) and cloud nodes.
The infrastructure of the testbed subsystems are provided in Table 5.1. The
resources allocated to the edge and cloud subsystems are conventional low-resource
edge and high-resources cloud. Our edge-cloud execution model used a proximal
1CSC-Tieteen tietotekniikan keskus Oy, https://csc.fi
2https://azure.microsoft.com/en-in/services/cognitive-services/computer-vision
3https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-4-model-b/
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Figure 5.2: K3s pods and node deployment
cluster of edge stations (of Raspberry Pi’s) and remote cloud nodes provided by
CSC.
On the deployment aspect, all the elastic platform services were deployed us-
ing k3s4. K3s is a highly-available certified version of Kubernetes for container
orchestration of production workload in resource-constrained edge subsystems. It
integrates especially well for the 64-bit ARM architecture, making it suitable for
deployment over Raspberry PI.
The deployment of the platform services on any Kubernetes orchestration plat-
form is done as container “pods”. We adopted the custom deployment strategy
to ensure allocation of pods to the location of our choice. For example, the k3s
testbed assigned cloud video inference model to a cloud node that has GPU sup-
4https://k3s.io
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(a) input image (b) high-accuracy cloud (c) low-accuracy edge
Figure 5.3: Contrasting the inference accuracy from the standard COCO dataset
[39] (Cloud and edge resources were deployed over distributed k3s nodes)
port. The node-pod assignment strategy adopted by the testbed is described in
Appendix B. Figure 5.1 presents the command output and types of pod deployed
and Figure 5.2 presents a high-level deployment view of pod name, node names
and IP addresses of different platform services running on k3s infrastructure ser-
vice. Nodes edge-1 and edge-2 host two pods each whereas, edge-3 and cloud-1
hosts only a single pod.
5.2.2 Elasticity of testbed
As per our elasticity model defined in Section 4.2, the testbed and ZETA focuses
on resource elasticity. Kubernetes and by extension k3s supports variety of tech-
niques for providing resource elasticity. More popular techniques for PaaS and
IaaS auto-scaling solutions include Horizontal Pod Autoscaler (HPA)5, Vertical
Pod Autoscaler (VPA) and Libra [7]. Recently, FaaS resource elasticity can also
be integrated into the Kubernetes autoscaler through Knative framework [34].
Among these, HPA is easy to use through manifests, integrated quite well into
5https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/run-application/horizontal-pod-autoscale/
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Listing 5.1: Sample (incomplete) HPA autoscaler for main-web-server
---
ap iVers ion : a u t o s c a l i n g / v2beta2
kind: Hor izonta lPodAutosca ler
spec :
s ca l eTargetRe f :
kind: Deployment
name: main−web−s e r v e r
minRepl icas : 1
maxReplicas: 3
metr i c s :
- type: Resource
r e s ou r c e :
name: memory
---
the Kubernetes ecosystem, and most popular autoscaling solution used in the in-
dustry. An excerpt of this HPA autoscaler can be seen in Listing 5.1. As per
the HPA rule, addition of new instance was done upon variation of memory al-
located to a pod. High-accuracy, high-latency inferences are performed on cloud
whereas low-accuracy, low-latency inference is done on edge server. Figure 5.3
presents the result of high-accuracy vs low-accuracy inference on the Microsoft
COCO dataset [39]. In the baseline scenario, the decision to offload is taken by
the edge-preprocessor (refer to the activity diagram in Figure 3.5(b)).
Testing criteria: The primary criteria was to use ZETA (and it’s contextual trust
computation and policies) to provide ZTA in edge-cloud inference in offloading.
The Authentication endpoint of ZETA was called by <<edge-node B>> (refer to
the activity diagram in Figure 3.5(b)). The other testing criteria was to examine
how the trust-level output would behave when the trust configurations were varied
in run-time.
5.2.3 Evaluation: ZETA with ML video inference
The preprocessor service (of the ML video inference scenario) attempted to gen-
erate an elasticity token through ZETA. If this request was accepted (i.e. ZETA
generated the token), it would imply accepting the elasticity request to offload to
the cloud node. The Rego policy allowed elasticity token generation on medium or
high trust level output. We examined how the trust-level output (and the token
generation) would behave when a) trust-sensitivity parameter was varied and b)
noise parameter was varied. Varying trust sensitivity ensures there is no change
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(a) Low trust level for trust-sensitivity = 3






































(b) High trust level for trust-sensitivity = 9
Figure 5.4: ML video inference scenario: Trust level variation by changing the
trust-sensitivity parameter
in regression curve where as the noise parameter changes the regression output
as well as the trust level. So, examining the behaviour of ZETA under these two
situations is ideal.
As described in Section 4.5.2, in all these scenarios, the input values were
normalized and provided as a tuple. The normalized request input for time was
sampled randomly which was 20. At time value=20, 22 was the normalized con-
tainer memory requested (unnormalized container memory request was approx
600MB). The trust-sensitivity parameter, which is inversely proportional to trust
levels was varied to be three and nine. These two values are selected to ensure a
healthy variation in trust levels. The noise was varied for all the three possible
values which are high, medium and low. We plot a graph of all the outputs for
better visualization.
5.2.3.1 Trust-sensitivity parameter variation results
The results are presented in Figure 5.4. It shows variation of trust levels boundaries
without any variation of the regression output by modifying the trust-sensitivity
parameter. In Figure 5.4(a), the trust levels are small. The evaluated trust for
(20,22) was therefore low and the elasticity token was not generated. In contrast,
in Figure 5.4(b), the trust level are large and therefore more lenient. The evaluated
trust for the same input values was high and ZETA permitted to offload inference
request.
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(a) None trust level for noise = ‘low’






































(b) Low trust level for noise = ‘medium’






































(c) Medium trust level for noise = ‘high’
Figure 5.5: ML video inference scenario: Trust level variation by changing the
noise parameter
5.2.3.2 Noise parameter variation results
The results are presented in Figure 5.5. The output clearly shows that noise
parameter dictates the smoothness of the regression curve and the uncertainties
around it. When the noise parameter is low (see Figure 5.5(a)), the trust value
gets evaluated to none and hence the elasticity request is rejected. Whereas when
the noise is ‘medium’ (in Figure 5.5(b)), the same input value gets evaluated to
low and elasticity request is rejected. In Figure 5.5(c), with ‘high’ noise parameter,
the trust is evaluated as medium and the elasticity request is granted.
5.3 Scenario II: GPON Monitoring System
The GPON monitoring scenario (discussed in Section 3.2) is one of the more
traditional elastic platforms. Our evaluation on such a scenario demonstrates
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ZETA’s utilization on pre-existing and ‘traditional’ use-cases.
5.3.1 Testbed
The GPON testbed is implemented at IoTCloudSamples (the discussion and URL
can be found in Section 3.2) and uses dockerized platform services. Each of these
platform service has to be provisioned manually at suitable location. This is in
contrast with the ML video inference scenario where the k3s provides a single-click
distributed service deployment facility.
The infrastructure is kept similar to ensure that the requests and trust output
results are comparable. However, since the GPON scenario is designed to be
deployed at x86 machines, we utilize two virtualized edge systems (with same
hardware profile) and not three Raspberry Pis. The cloud worker node is reused
from Table 5.1.
5.3.2 Elasticity of testbed
Unlike the ML video inference scenario that has HPA and VPA ingrained into
Kubernetes (and by extension k3s), the GPON scenario requires external scripts
to enforce elasticity. In this scenario, a script provisions a new edge message
broker upon request. This worker instance of edge broker connects to main edge
broker and adds horizontal scaling capability. This external script interacts with
the ZETA.
Testing criteria: Similar to previous scenario, the primary criteria was to use
ZETA (and it’s contextual trust computation and policies) to provide ZTA. In this
scenario, the Authentication endpoint of ZETA was called by external script that
controls the number of edge message brokers. If the request was accepted, the
script would add one extra message broker. As with the previous case, the other
testing criteria was to examine how the trust-level output would behave when the
trust configurations were varied.
5.3.3 Evaluation: ZETA with GPON
The external message broker provisioning script requested an elasticity token
through ZETA before adding a worker message broker node. If this request was
accepted (i.e. ZETA generated the token), it would imply accepting the elasticity
request. Similar to the previous scenario, the Rego policy allowed elasticity token
generation on medium or high trust level output. As with the previous scenario,
we examined how the trust-level output (and the token generation) would behave
when a) trust-sensitivity parameter was varied and b) noise parameter was varied.
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(a) Low trust level for trust-sensitivity = 3






































(b) High trust level for trust-sensitivity = 9
Figure 5.6: GPON scenario: Trust level variation by changing the trust-sensitivity
parameter
Similar to Section 4.5.2, in all these scenarios, the input values were normalized
and provided as a tuple. The normalized sampling input request was (20,81). Here,
20 is the normalized time value (which is the same from the last time) and 81 is
the container memory (the unnormalized edge message broker memory request
was 250MB). As with the last scenario, trust-sensitivity parameter was varied to
be three and nine and the noise was varied for all the three possible values which
are high, medium and low.
5.3.3.1 Trust-sensitivity parameter variation results
Figure 5.6 presents the graph of the results. At sensitivity 3 (in Figure 5.6(a)) the
trust level output was low and hence, the request was rejected. In case of trust
sensitivity value as 9 (in Figure 5.6(b)), the trust level output was medium with
wider trust level boundaries and the request was accepted.
5.3.3.2 Noise parameter variation results
Figure 5.7(a) presents the output at low noise. The regression curve is tight with
very low uncertainty and therefore trust levels. The output trust level evaluated
was none and the elasticity request was rejected. Figure 5.7(b) is the output
at noise value medium. The trust level boundaries are considerably more liberal
and the trust output was evaluated as medium and the request was accepted.
Figure 5.7(c) shows the regression curve at noise value high. The trust level output
for the given input is high and therefore, the elasticity request was accepted.
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(a) None trust level for noise = ‘low’






































(b) Low trust level for noise = ‘medium’






































(c) Medium trust level for noise = ‘high’
Figure 5.7: GPON scenario: Trust level variation by changing the noise parameter
5.4 Performance evaluation
Since ZETA is platform agnostic, the performance of the framework should remain
same in all scenarios. Therefore, in the performance evaluation, we evaluate the
framework on performance metrics including CPU, end-to-end latency and memory
consumption. Evaluation on each of these parameters provides a validation on real-
world resource usage. For example, upon measuring end-to-end latency on the
ML video inference scenario, a CSP can estimate realistic SLA guarantees while
integrating ZETA framework into their products. The evaluation was performed
on the same deployment infrastructure as described in Section 5.1.2.
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Figure 5.8: Impact on system CPU utilization for generating auth-tokens under
concurrent requests
We used cAdvisor6 and Prometheus7 to export the runtime framework con-
tainer metrics. K68 stress-test framework was used for API stress test via it’s
virtual users that enables metric reports under concurrent requests.
5.4.1 Auth token generation
• CPU utilization: Auth token generation is relatively computationally inex-
pensive process which is reflected by the results. Figure 5.8 presents the results of
impact of the CPU utilization by the framework under concurrent load. We can
see that the total CPU utilization grows linearly with the increase in concurrent
requests. However, even under 40 parallel virtual users, the framework utilized
just under 8% of the total CPU to generate auth-tokens. The memory utilization
of the framework averaged 102MB throughout the evaluation.
• Latency: The other important performance metric is the total response time
to generate auth-tokens. Figure 5.9 presents the impact on the response time
under growing concurrent requests. At 40 concurrent requests, the framework was
generating over 35 auth-tokens per seconds. However, the latency of the request
remained quite stable. We can see that the average response time increased from




CHAPTER 5. EVALUATION 85




















Figure 5.9: Impact on average response time for generating auth-tokens under
concurrent requests
remains stable which can be inferred from the p(95) (95th percentile) response time
curve. The p(95) went up marginally from 89ms to 144ms even under heavy load
and most requests were processed under 150ms.
5.4.2 Elasticity token generation
Elasticity token generation is significantly more resource-intensive than auth-token
and requires communication between multiple components of the framework.
• CPU utilization: Figure 5.10 presents the impact on the CPU utilization
of the system while generating the elasticity token. As more concurrent requests
are made, the cumulative CPU utilization goes up significantly. As evident from
Figure 5.10(a) and Figure 5.10(b), the overall CPU utilization of the framework
is largely driven by trust-compute-service. It comprise a major chunk of the
total CPU utilization and quickly becomes a bottleneck of the request/response
throughput. As the number of concurrent requests increase, all the ZETA frame-
work services show an increase in total CPU utilization. However all except one
of them remains under 1% utilization. The trust-compute-service goes utiliz-
ing from 11% (at 1 worker) to almost 45% (at 25 concurrent workers) of the total
testbed CPU. The overall CPU utilization remains hovers around 50% during peak
load and remains at 11% under single request load.
• Latency: The latency and response rate results are plotted in Figure 5.11.
Unlike the auth-token generation latency, the elasticity token generation scales lin-
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(b) high CPU usage services
Figure 5.10: Impact on system CPU utilization for generating elasticity tokens
under concurrent requests






































Figure 5.11: Impact on average response time for generating elasticity tokens under
concurrent requests
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Figure 5.12: Impact on average response time for generating elasticity tokens under
concurrent requests
early with concurrent requests. At a single worker, the total end-to-end elasticity
token generation latency was 330ms. The latency remains almost constant at 5
concurrent workers at 448ms. The response latency showed linear increase and
stood at an average of 5700ms per elasticity token at 25 concurrent workers. The
p(95) response time curve also displayed a linear increase indicating stable per-
formance under heavy load. The p(95) went up from 541ms to 6643ms. Finally,
the average response rate decreased from processing 0.74 requests per second per
worker to 0.15 requests per second per worker.
• Memory Consumption: The total and individual service’s memory con-
sumption has been plotted in Figure 5.12. Unlike CPU utilization, the memory
consumption is equally distributed among the different components of the ZETA
framework. The trust-compute-service shows slight increase in memory con-
sumption with the increase in concurrent requests, whereas the memory consump-
tion of remaining services remains almost constant even under increased load. As
a result, the total memory consumption goes up from 96MB to 117MB during the
evaluation.
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5.5 Discussion
In this section, we analyse the results, discuss the implications and further provide
the limitations of the framework.
5.5.1 Result comparison between scenarios
The results presented in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.3 provide an insight into ZETA’s
trust evaluation component under different scenario. It is evident that ZETA
provides a contextual trust evaluation based on observed and service knowledge.
In case of GPON scenario, the trust level boundaries were more relaxed compared
to ML video inference scenario. This is because the uncertainties from the GPR
regression were higher. It is apparent when we compare graphs in Figure 5.5(c)
and Figure 5.7(c).
Another interesting observation is how outliers are treated by the trust com-
putation algorithm. In case of ML video inference, the deviation in the memory
consumption is very high. Therefore, the regression is underfitted (especially un-
der high noise situations) in this scenario. It indicates that the default GPR trust
algorithm can be substituted (extended) by the provider for a more robust algo-
rithm. On the other hand, the deviation in memory consumption in the GPON
scenario is low as it handles continuous data streams as opposed to video frames.
The default GPR trust algorithm produces decent curve fitting even under high
noise.
From Table 5.2, we can see ZETA’s feature of contextual trust evaluation
changes with both the scenarios (context) and configuration parameters. The
output by varying the same parameter differs in each of the scenarios. For exam-
ple, in case of ML video inference, at noise ‘low’, the output was rejected whereas
it was accepted in the case of GPON. This is because the uncertainties in GPON
scenario is higher. Moreover, it can be seen from these results that ZETA allows
the providers to easily calibrate the trust parameters. Therefore, the providers
can tune the trust computation algorithm depending on their use case within the
scenario. For example, if the ML video inference scenario is used for airport surveil-
lance, the provider could set the noise as high and trust sensitivity as 9 to ensure
Scenario Trust-sensitivity = 3 Trust-sensitivity = 9 Noise = low Noise = medium Noise = high
MLVI Low (7) High (3) None (7) Low (7) Medium (3)
GPON Low (7) Medium (3) None (7) Medium (3) High (3)
Table 5.2: Comparison of trust-level evaluation results and ZETA’s response
(3) = elasticity request accepted / (7) = elasticity request denied
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each request gets a high-accuracy offloading. Whereas, for generic use-cases (such
as a grocery store), the provider can set the noise to medium and sensitivity to a
lower values (such as 3).
The evaluation also demonstrated how each parameter independently influences
the trust level. The trust level bounds are inversely proportional to accuracy
parameter. The trust-sensitivity parameter only affects the trust level boundaries
(GPR uncertainties) but not the regression curve. This implies that it can be used
for relaxing the trust level by providers in cases where the observed knowledge is
harmonic or periodic. On the other hand, the noise parameter affects the GPR
regression curve as well as the uncertainties. So providers can use this configuration
parameter for managing the elasticity of highly dynamic platform microservices.
Finally, the accuracy parameter can be used to improve performance. Therefore,
each of these configurations address a different aspect of trust fine-tuning.
In the ZETA framework, the trust level output is a function of the trust algo-
rithm. As this trust algorithm is extensible, the trust levels cannot be fixed by the
framework and need to be determined by the providers of the ZETA framework.
We discuss the limitation of this approach in upcoming subsection.
5.5.2 Analysis of performance evaluation results
The performance evaluation results demonstrate the stability of ZETA framework
under request load. From plots in Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.10, we can confirm
that the framework is compute intensive rather than memory intensive. Hence,
the stakeholder must ensure framework deployment on compute intensive work-
loads [36]. However due to small memory footprint and low computational re-
quirements of most of the components ZETA is an ideal candidate for edge-cloud
computation offloading [87]. As all the components are distributed, the Trust
computation component can be offloaded to cloud. Finally, the analysis is done
on the default GPR trust algorithm whose performance can be boosted by deploy-
ing the trust component on GPU based machines. Such a deployment strategy is
more optimized if the trust computation interface is extended and complex DNN
algorithms are used by the stakeholder.
5.5.3 Analysis of the framework security
Another aspect is of the security of framework and potential attack surface areas.
Our threat model (in Section 4.3) describes ZETA as secure and the infrastruc-
ture/platform services as insecure. The most common attack surface area in such
attack models is deployment infrastructure. For example, an Arbitrary Code Ex-
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ecution (ACE) attack (such as CVE-2019-57369) on the docker containers of the
framework components can give root access of the container to the attacker. There-
fore, care must be taken by the stakeholder while deploying the framework. Use of
TEE backed remote container attestation techniques [20] can greatly mitigate com-
mon attacks including side-channel and cross-channel attacks. Moreover, recent
researches such as [59, 80] demonstrate the feasibility and performance of trusted
ML inference. Other best practises related to security of framework include using
secure password for the user-endpoint configuration, periodic external certificate
revocation.
We present the security benefits of the interaction model:
 In case an infrastructure service (that deploys platform service B) that al-
ready has the auth token of another platform service A is compromised, our
framework will not issue any elasticity token request as it will look at the
metrics of service A to compute trust.
 As the auth token is valid only for specific capabilities of deployment A, even
if the trust model on the framework fails, the elasticity token will only be
granted with limited capabilities.
 Developers can configure the policies centrally rather than wandering around
with individual configuration files for each infrastructure deployment.
There are some other advantages of this token based approach such as the
asynchronous on-demand elasticity request handling while still maintaining high
security guarantees. Through ZETA framework, any service can choose to com-
pletely or partially delegate its elasticity capabilities to another service that the
provider trusts.
The current design of ZETA prevents popular trust evaluation attacks include
bad-mouthing attacks, sybil whitewashing attacks, and collusion attacks [81] while
maintaining the subjectivity and context awareness of the trust. However, an
amplified on-off attack [16] ZETA may affect trust computation algorithm.
5.5.4 Comparison with related frameworks
Table 5.3 presents a comparison of ZETA with other related frameworks. We
explained these researches and the frameworks in Section 2.3. While these frame-
works are not completely similar to ZETA in purpose, they support establishing
trust on edge and cloud subsystems, and hence are comparable. From the table,
we can seen ZETA easily is the most feature rich among them.
9https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5736/
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Features Papadkis et
al. [55]












































Extensibility 7 3 NA 7 7 3
Trust customiz-
ability
7 NA 7 3 7 3
Policy support 3 3 3 3 7 3
Delegation 7 7 3 7 3 3
Security 7 NA 3 NA 3 3
High Availabil-
ity
7 NA 7 NA 3 7
Table 5.3: Comparative analysis of ZETA’s features with related frameworks
5.5.5 Lessons learned
While the framework supports extensibility of trust algorithm, one of the limita-
tions of the ZETA framework is that it requires “interpretation” of the trust levels
provided by the ZETA providers. That is, any stakeholder that uses ZETA would
require domain expertise in understanding the trust-level offered by the provider.
As the trust level is tunable by the provider, changing the ZETA provider would
require fresh interpretation and possible policy update by the users. And while
the users can apply custom policies on the trust-evaluation result, this process still
requires some context based knowledge by the users to determine suitable trust
levels. For example, a database deployed on a VM by provider A could require
medium trust level, whereas another database deployed in Kubernetes by provider
B can require high trust to scale up. The framework provides no recommendation
to the stakeholder about the “best” choice of trust levels.
ZETA framework is compute-intensive, which unlike memory-intensive work-
load is more difficult to scale-up. The main bottleneck as seen from the load test
results is Trust computation component which in current iteration does not sup-
port GPU integration. Addition of this feature into ZETA would boost the trust
computation performance significantly. Finally, another factor to consider is avail-
ability of the framework. There are multiple single-point-of-failure components in
the framework. However, the availability can be boosted sufficiently by deploying
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multiple independent but geo-partitioned instances of ZETA.
ZETA utilizes HTTP header authentication which is not as secure as trusted
third-party certificates. As ZETA lacks certificate based authentication, it does
not integrate out-of-box with sidecar proxies such as Istio10. The decision to
support only HTTP header ensures easier integration with computationally chal-
lenged platform services running on edge subsystem. In future, support for cer-
tificate based cloud infrastructure service authentication can be added. Through
the “extern PSK” mode [27] with TLS1.3, edge infrastructure services can also
use certificate based authentication and hence, HTTP header authentication can
be completely phased out.
5.6 Summary
We performed and discussed the evaluation of ZETA framework in this chapter.
This evaluation was performed on two real-world scenarios consisting of a cluster
of edge and cloud subsystems. The encouraging results demonstrate that ZETA
is successful in allowing stakeholders (both providers and users) to fine-tune the
desired trust level through configuration files. ZETA also performs well under load
test and was able to service very high number of requests even on a basic VM.
We also discussed limitations and the lessons learned during the evaluation
of the framework. It requires fixing of trust-level computation output by the
providers and is computationally expensive to operate. Moreover, few approaches
like certificate based authentication can be integrated into ZETA to achieve higher
security during interaction. Nonetheless, the evaluation on two real-world scenarios
is extremely encouraging and demonstrates the feasibility in incorporating ZTA
into the elasticity operations through ZETA framework.
10https://istio.io/
Chapter 6
Conclusion and future work
6.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we aim to increase the trust of elasticity operation in edge-cloud
platform services by introducing ZTA paradigm into these operations. To support
ZTA, we first gather functional and non-functional requirements via two real-world
scenario. These two scenarios are diverse in platform and infrastructure services
to ensure wide support of the extract requirements. Based on these requirements,
we design the ZETA framework and the interaction model. Our platform-agnostic
interaction model supports infrastructure services over common control or data
plane and uses a JWT token based approach. The design of token ensures integrity
during interaction and prevention from network attacks such as replay or forgery.
Moreover, through the use of two different tokens, ZETA also supports delegation
of elasticity between edge-cloud services.
One of the cornerstones of the ZETA framework is the context based trust
computation from the derived knowledge base. ZETA builds its knowledge from
the service information as well as the observed service metrics. Through the use
of service and observed knowledge, the multi-dimensional trust computation de-
termines the trust level of elasticity request. The other important aspect of ZETA
is to provide trust customization to different stakeholders. While the default trust
computation algorithm uses GPR to perform a multi-dimensional regression and
sample trust level from it, ZETA support extensibility by allowing the provider
to use custom trust algorithm. Moreover, through configuration files, the default
trust computation algorithm can be fine-tuned. On the other hand, users can up-
load custom Rego policies to ZETA and enforce the required trust levels of their
platform services at a granular level.
We performed both the feasibility and performance evaluation of the frame-
work. The feasibility evaluation was based on two diverse and real-world sce-
93
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 94
narios. The evaluation aimed at the validation of ZETA’s ability of contextual
trust evaluation and variation of trust level boundaries through configuration files.
The performance evaluation studied the resource consumption and bottlenecks of
ZETA under sustained parallel elasticity requests. It demonstrated exceptional
token generation response time even when deployed on modest VM configuration.
The evaluation results and subsequent discussion indicated how ZETA can be
effectively used to increase trust in the elasticity operations of edge-cloud services.
6.2 Future work
As discussed in Section 5.5.5, ZETA currently does not support GPU based infer-
ence for trust computation. Addition of dedicated GPU for faster inference along
with Gaussian process frameworks such as GPflow [45] will boost the inference
speed. Furthermore, use of TLS certificates with extern PSK mode can provide
improved security while maintaining a low certificate verification latency [27].
Use of microservice design principles such as circuit breaker [49] and ser-
vice discovery [74] can be used to improve resiliency of ZETA’s components [46].
Currently, ZETA supports only one default GPR algorithm. In future, we can
add multiple trust computation algorithms and present a catalogue to the stake-
holder. Popular trust computation techniques such as semi-supervised trust [31],
CAST [88] and particle swarm optimization [44] can be added as a configuration.
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Appendix A
Appendix: GPON data schema and
sample
TIME: record time
PROVINCECODE: code o f the network s e c t o r
DEVICEID: id o f dev i c e
IFINDEX : i n t e r f a c e id
FRAME: frame id
SLOT: s l o t id
PORT: port number
ONUINDEX: onu index
ONUID: network i n t e r f a c e
SPEEDIN: t r a f f i c moved in to an ONU( network i n t e r f a c e )
↪→ measured in b i t / s
SPEEDOUT: t r a f f i c moved out an ONU( network i n t e r f a c e )
↪→ measured in b i t / s
Listing A.1: GPON data schema
PROVINCECODE DEVICEID IFINDEX FRAME SLOT PORT ONUINDEX ONUID TIME SPEEDIN SPEEDOUT
HKD 2222771642618 6828878457269 1 1 13 20 222277164261810113020 01/08/2019 11:38:33 2992 2947
HKD 2222771642618 6828878457269 1 1 13 21 222277164261810113021 01/08/2019 11:38:33 31271245 1414548
HKD 2222771642618 6828878457269 1 1 13 2 222277164261810113002 01/08/2019 11:38:33 677495 20658
HKD 2222771642618 6828878457269 1 1 13 3 222277164261810113003 01/08/2019 11:38:33 0 0
HKD 2222771642618 6828878457269 1 1 13 1 222277164261810113001 01/08/2019 11:38:33 1366458 42488
Table A.1: Sample GPON data




Appendix: K3s deployment strate-
gies
B.1 Edge deployment strategy
Scheduling eviction strategy was used to reassign pods onto the correct infrastruc-
ture1. The most recommended approach for this is through the use of
kubernetes.spec.template.spec.nodeSelector k8s configuration. In this ap-
proach, we first assign the role (node-role.kubernetes.io/worker) and then
label the nodes. Finally, the pods can the be strategically deployed using a con-
figuration manifest similar to Listing B.1.
Listing B.1: Sample k3s nodeSelector deployment
spec :
r e p l i c a s : 1
s e l e c t o r :
matchLabels:
app: edge−pr ep ro c e s s o r
template:
metadata:
l a b e l s :
app: edge−pr ep ro c e s s o r
spec :
nodeSe l e c to r :
deploymentType: "edgeWorker.rdsea.csc"
c o n t a i n e r s :
- name: edge−pr ep ro c e s s o r
1https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/scheduling-eviction/assign-pod-node/
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B.2 GPU over K3s
Nvidia GPU’s are not natively supported by the containerd2, which is the default
runtime of k3s and k8s. One of the techniques to support GPU is by switching
the container runtime to docker container runtime3. However, both k3s and k8s
are now use containerd as their default runtime. Moreover, smaller footprint of
containerd makes it more ideal for our testbed infrastructure over spread across
cloud and Raspberry Pi’s. Additionally, one of our requirements was support of
both GPU and non-GPU type of infrastructure together.
Therefore, to enable GPU support4, containerd’s configurations require adding
the lines from Listing B.2 only on the GPU nodes.
Listing B.2: Sample k3s nodeSelector deployment
[ p lug in s . c r i . conta inerd . runtimes . runc ]
#--- - changed from 'io.containerd.runc.v2' for GPU support
runt ime type = "io.containerd.runtime.v1.linux"
#--- - added for GPU support
[ p lug in s . l i nux ]
runtime = "nvidia-container -runtime"
Finally, we use the scheduling eviction strategy described in Section B.1 to
deploy pods strategically on GPU and non-GPU resources. A sample labelling
strategy has been show in listing below:
$ k3s kubect l l a b e l node NODE NAME GPU WORKER NODE NAME=XXX
2https://containerd.io/
3https://www.docker.com/products/container-runtime
4https://dev.to/mweibel/add-nvidia-gpu-support-to-k3s-with-containerd-4j17
